

or after December 28, 1989 to enable NICTD to commence commuter operations on January 1, 1990.

NICTD's common carrier obligation is limited to providing passenger rail service. Any and all obligations to transport freight have been assumed by South Shore¹ pursuant to CSSSB's reorganization plan and South Shore's exemption notice in Finance Docket No. 31575, *supra*.

This notice is filed under 49 CFR 1180.2(d)(7). Petitions to revoke the exemption under 49 U.S.C. 10505(d) may be filed at any time. The filing of a petition to revoke will not stay the transaction. Pleadings must be filed with the Commission and served on: Kelvin J. Dowd, Slover & Loftus, 1224 Seventeenth St., NW., Washington, DC 20036.

As a condition to the use of this exemption, any employees affected by the transaction will be protected pursuant of *Norfolk and Western Ry. Co.—Trackage Rights—BN*, 354 I.C.C. 605 (1978) as modified in *Mendocino Coast Ry., Inc.—Lease and Operate*, 360 I.C.C. 653 (1980).

Decided: January 4, 1990.

By the Commission, Joseph H. Dettmar,
Acting Director, Office of Proceedings.

Norela R. McGee,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 90-595 Filed 1-9-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7035-01-M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

Arizona State University; Advanced Helicopter Electromagnetic Industrial Associates Program

Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. 4301 *et seq.* ("the Act"), Arizona State University on November 27, 1989 filed a written notification, on behalf of the parties identified below, simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing (1) the identities of the parties to the following joint research and development venture: Advanced Helicopter Electromagnetics Industrial Associates Program, and (2) the nature and objectives of the joint research and development venture. The notifications were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting

the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. Pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act, the identities of the parties to the joint research and development venture, and its general areas of planned activities, are given below:

The identity of the parties to the Industrial Associates Program are as follows:

1. Arizona Board of Regents for and on behalf of Arizona State University ("University")

2. United Technologies Corporation, Sikorsky Aircraft Division

3. Rockwell International, Collins Defense Communications

4. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company

The nature and objectives of the Industrial Associates Program are as follows:

The Program is established through individual agreements between University and interested companies. Companies participating in the Program are referred to as "Associates". The purpose of the Program is to support research at the Arizona State University Telecommunications Research Center (the "Center") in an effort to further develop analytical methods for advanced helicopter applications, and then use the anechoic test chamber located at the Center for testing and analysis verification. Research initiatives under the Program will be selected based on the recommendations of the advisory task force for the Program, which will be comprised of Associate representatives and representatives of certain interested federal agencies. Research initiatives will be directed toward the analysis of antennas on helicopter structures, and analysis of scattering and absorption characteristics of scale-model targets. The test proposed will also verify numerical, analytical and computer models being developed to predict the antenna and scattering characteristics of desired targets. The expectation is that such models will save time and money in the development of advanced antenna concepts for helicopters using conventional conductive and modern composite fuselage configurations. The goals of the Program are to (i) facilitate the exchange of information and research results on recent advances in the area of advanced helicopter electromagnetic research and developments; (ii) support research at the Center on topics of mutual interest to the community of advanced avionics antenna technology; (iii) develop standard practices for evaluation and comparison of helicopter antennas mounted on metallic and non-metallic

configurations; and (iv) collect and disseminate information on state-of-the-art helicopter scale model testing and applications methods.

Joseph H. Widmar,

Director of Operations Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 90-560 Filed 1-9-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-01-M

CAD Framework Initiative, Inc.; Filing of Changes in Membership

Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. 4301, *et seq.* ("the Act"), CAD Framework Initiative, Inc. ("CFI") on November 15, 1989, filed an additional written notification simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in the membership of CFI, Inc. The additional notification was filed for the purpose of extending the protections of section 4 of the Act, limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specific circumstances.

On December 30, 1988, CFI filed its original notification pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the *Federal Register* pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on March 13, 1989, (54 FR 10456). On May 17, 1989, CFI filed an additional written notification. The Department published a notice in response to this additional notification on June 22, 1989 (54 FR 26265). A correction to the additional notification was published on August 4, 1989 (54 FR 32141); a further correction was published on August 23, 1989 (54 FR 35091). On August 16, 1989, CFI filed an additional written notification. The Department published a notice in response to this additional notification on September 21, 1989 (54 FR 38912).

Since the last notification of membership changes on August 16, 1989, there have been the following changes in CFI's membership: (1) The addition of corporate members: Fujitsu Microelectronics, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., and Zuken, Inc., and (2) the addition of associate members: Carol Daane, Michael Heck, Amir Hekmatpour, Hilary Kahn, Eskil Khelkerud, Karl Neusinger, and Greg Wasche.

Joseph H. Widmar,

Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 90-561 Filed 1-9-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-01-M

¹ See Finance Docket No. 31577, *Chicago South Shore & S.B. R. Co. and Northern Ind. Commuter Trans. Dist.—Pet. for Decl. Order—Com. Car. Obligation* (not printed), served December 29, 1989.

OSI/Network Management Forum; Additional Membership Filing

Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. 4301 *et seq.* ("the Act"), the OSI/Network Management Forum, (the "Forum") on November 22, 1989, filed an additional written notification simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing additions to its membership. The additional written notification was filed for the purpose of extending the protections of section 4 of the Act, limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances.

On October 21, 1988, the Forum filed its original notification pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on December 8, 1988, 53 FR 49615. On December 23, 1988, March 23, 1989, July 3, 1989, and September 28, 1989, the Forum filed additional written notifications pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published notices in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) on January 28, 1989, 54 FR 3870, April 25, 1989, 54 FR 17834, August 4, 1989, 54 FR 32141, and October 26, 1989, 54 FR 43631.

The identities of the additional parties to the venture are given below:

Voting Members

Digital Equipment Corporation, 550 King Street (LKG2-2/NO1), Littleton, MA 01460

International Business Machines Corporation, P.O. Box 12195, Dept. H 14, Bldg. 062, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

Associate Members

Boeing Computer Services, P.O. Box 24346 M/S 7M-44, Seattle, WA 98124-0346

Cabletron Systems, Inc., P.O. Box 6257, East Rochester, NH 03867.

Joseph H. Widmar,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 90-562 Filed 1-9-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-01-M

Software Productivity Consortium; Filing of Withdrawal of TRW Inc.'s Membership

Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 4301 *et seq.* (the "Act"), Software Productivity Consortium ("SPC") on November 30, 1989, filed a written

notification simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing TRW Inc.'s withdrawal as a member of SPC, effective September 30, 1989. The notification was filed for the purpose of maintaining the protections of the Act limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances.

No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned activity of SPC.

On December 21, 1984, SPC filed its original notification pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on January 17, 1985, 50 FR 2633. Since then, SPC filed additional notifications on April 23, 1985, September 24, 1985, December 10, 1985, and February 13, 1986, identifying changes in its membership, and the Department of Justice published notice of these changes in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on May 21, 1985, 50 FR 20954; October 22, 1985, 50 FR 42786; January 13, 1986, 51 FR 1450; and March 11, 1986, 51 FR 8373, respectively. SPC also filed additional notifications on December 19, 1988 and December 27, 1988, notice of which the Justice Department published on January 31, 1989, 54 FR 4922, and another notification on March 23, 1989, notice of which the Department published on May 4, 1989, 54 FR 19256-19257.

Joseph H. Widmar,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 90-563 Filed 1-9-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-01-M

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Permit Applications Received Under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of permit applications received under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, Public Law 95-541.

SUMMARY: The National Science Foundation (NSF) is required to publish notice of permit applications received to conduct activities regulated under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. NSF has published regulations under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 at title 45 part 670 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This is the required notice of permit applications received.

DATE: Interested parties are invited to submit written data, comments, or views

with respect to these permit applications by February 12, 1990. Permit applications may be inspected by interested parties at the Permit Office, address below.

ADDRESS: Comments should be addressed to Permit Office, Room 627, Division of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, Washington, DC 20550.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles E. Myers at the above address or (202) 357-7932.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION: The National Science Foundation, as directed by the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-541), has developed regulations that implement the "Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora" for all United States citizens. The Agreed Measures, developed in 1964 by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, recommended establishment of a permit system for various activities in Antarctica and designation of certain animals and certain geographic areas as requiring special protection. The regulations establish such a permit system to designate Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest. Additional information was published in the Federal Register on July 17, 1989.

The application received is as follows:
1. *Applicant:* Mahlon C. Kennicutt, Texas A&M University, 10 South Graham Road, College Station, Texas 77845

Activity for Which Permit Requested

Taking, import into U.S.A., enter Specially Protected Area. The applicant is conducting research on seabirds—specifically the effects of the February 1989 fuel oil spill from the Argentine vessel Bahia Paraiso. He requests permission to salvage dead specimens of sea birds for research purposes and import specimens into the U.S.A.

Location

Palmer Station and vicinity, Antarctica, Specially Protected Area No. 17, Litchfield Island.

Dates

March 1990-March 1991.

Charles E. Myers,
Polar Coordination Specialist.

[FR Doc. 90-558 Filed 1-9-90; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Biweekly Notice Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

Pursuant to Public Law (P.L.) 97-415, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. P.L. 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from December 15, 1989 through December 28, 1989. The last biweekly notice was published on December 27, 1989 (54 FR 53200).

NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room P-223, Phillips Building, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By February 9, 1990 the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the Local Public Document Room for the particular facility involved. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendments under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 325-6000 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

Arizona Public Service Company, et al.,
Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529
and STN 50-530, Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1, 2
and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona

Date of amendment request: October 24, 1989

Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendments would modify the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51 and NPF-74 of PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 respectively), Section 3.3.1 to change the referenced Action statement of the Excure Log Power and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Matrix Logic Channels of Table 3.3-1 to a new Action statement.

More specifically, the currently applicable action statement (Action 8) which states: "With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore an inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open an affected reactor trip breaker within the next hour" would be revised to reflect that all reactor trip breakers will be opened rather than the affected reactor trip breaker if the inoperable channel is not returned to an operable status within 48 hours. This revised action statement, which would be labeled Action 9, is required since the "affected" reactor trip breaker cannot be determined from the output signal of the RPS Matrix logic channels.

Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The license has evaluated the proposed amendments against these standards and has provided the following discussion:

Standard 1 - Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The present Technical Specification would place the plant in a configuration which has not been defined by the safety analysis. Changing the action statement to the more appropriate ACTION 9 would place the plant in a safe configuration and would be consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis thus maintaining the same probability or consequences of an accident as was originally evaluated.

Standard 2 - Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The present Technical Specifications would place the plant in a configuration which has not been defined by the safety analysis. Changing the action statement to the more appropriate ACTION 9 would place the plant in a safe configuration and would be consistent with the assumptions made in the safety analysis thus not introducing any new or different kinds of accidents.

Standard 3 - Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The present Technical Specifications would place the plant in a configuration which has not been defined by the safety analysis. Changing the action statement to the more appropriate ACTION 9 would place the plant in a safe configuration and would be consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis thus maintaining the same margin of safety as was originally evaluated.

The staff has reviewed the licensees' no significant hazards analysis and concurs with their conclusions. As such, the staff proposes to determine that the requested changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Phoenix Public Library, Business and Science Division, 12 East McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona 85004.

Attorney for licensees: Mr. Arthur C. Gehr, Snell & Wilmer, 3100 Valley Center, Phoenix, Arizona 85007.

NRC Project Director: George W. Knighton

Arizona Public Service Company, et al.,
Docket No. STN 50-528 Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS),
Unit 1, Maricopa County, Arizona

Date of amendment request: October 25, 1989

Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.h of

Technical Specification (TS) Section 3/4.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems," by modifying the flow specifications associated with post-LOCA recirculation high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump simultaneous hot leg and cold leg injection flow balancing. Specifically, the upper flowrate limits for both hot leg and cold leg injection will be removed, and a total pump flowrate limit will be specified to provide pump runout protection.

Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has evaluated the proposed amendment against these standards and has provided the following discussion:

Standard 1 - Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment increases the maximum allowable flow from the HPSI pump during simultaneous hot and cold leg injection. The HPSI pump minimum runout flow was originally specified at 1130 gpm in both the Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Report System 80 (CESSAR) and to the pump vendor, Ingersoll-Rand. Ingersoll-Rand has verified that the pumps that [SIC] are capable of flows greater than 1200 gpm. This amendment utilizes the measured capability of the pump to increase the operational flexibility in the hot and cold leg simultaneous injection flow balancing. The assumptions in the safety analysis are not affected as the minimum flow values to both the hot and cold legs are maintained. The increased maximum flow value will increase the margin of safety in the analysis by allowing increased flushing flow to the vessel while maintaining the HPSI pump below its runout flowrate.

Standard 2 - Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment to the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements does not alter the plant configuration or operation. Credit is taken for the actual installed capability of the HPSI pumps. Increasing the maximum allowable flow beyond the minimum design specification of 1130 gpm can improve the plants performance during the long-term cooling phase of a loss of

coolant accident. The increased flow can provide a greater flushing action to prevent boron precipitation in the vessel and more water for decay heat removal during the long-term cooling phase of the accident.

Standard 3 - Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

As discussed in Standard 2, the proposed amendment can improve the margin of safety during the long-term cooling following a loss of coolant accident. The margin of safety during long-term cooling is determined by adequate flow to the vessel to match decay heat boiloff, prevent boron precipitation in the reactor vessel, and keep the HPSI pump flow below runout. All three of these requirements will be satisfied by the proposed amendment. The increased allowable flow can provide more margin to the flow required to the vessel to match the boiloff due to decay heat and prevent boron precipitation. The higher maximum allowable flow will also be below the runout condition of the HPSI pump. The PVNGS Nuclear Engineering Department also performed a review of the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for the HPSI pump and the diesel generator loading during long-term cooling and found this change to be acceptable to both.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards analysis and concurs with their conclusions. As such, the staff proposes to determine that the requested changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Phoenix Public Library, Business and Science Division, 12 East McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona 85004.

Attorney for licensees: Mr. Arthur C. Gehr, Snell & Wilmer, 3100 Valley Center, Phoenix, Arizona 85007.

NRC Project Director: George W. Knighton

Boston Edison Company, Docket No. 50-293, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts

Date of amendment request: December 7, 1989

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would replace the existing Pilgrim Technical Specification definition of surveillance frequency with a new definition which is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter (GL) 89-14, "Line-Item Improvements In Technical Specifications - Removal of the 3.25 Limit On Extending Surveillance Intervals." The proposed change also moves the definition of an operating cycle from the definition of surveillance frequency to the definition of surveillance interval. This places the definition of operating cycle under the proper heading and adds to the clarity of the definition of the surveillance frequency.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee addressed the above three standards in the amendment application. In regard to the three standards, the licensee provided the following analysis.

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Pilgrim experience shows the extension of surveillance intervals enhances safety by removing the need to perform a surveillance during plant conditions unsuitable to its performance, such as during transient plant conditions or when safety systems are out of service because of ongoing surveillance or maintenance activities. Limiting the maximum combined interval to 3.25 times the interval for three consecutive intervals does not increase safety because extending surveillance 25% presents a small risk in contrast to the alternative of a forced shutdown or performance during unsuitable plant conditions. This position on the safety impact of removing the 3.25 limit is supported by industry experience and documented in GL 89-14. Since the risk posed by this change is less than the risk associated with the existing limit, operating Pilgrim in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously analyzed.

(2) Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Removing the 3.25 limit on increasing surveillance intervals 25% reduces the possibility of a surveillance interval forcing a shutdown, or forcing the performance of a surveillance during unsuitable plant conditions. Its removal thereby reduces the risk associated with either alternative. It does not change plant equipment configuration or operation, and is administrative in nature. Hence, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Removing the 3.25 limit on increasing surveillance intervals 25% has been shown by industry experience, as documented in GL 89-14, to decrease risk when contrasted with the alternative actions potentially compelled by allowing it to remain in effect. Because risk is reduced by this proposed change, it does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination analysis. Based upon this review, the staff agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, based upon the above discussion, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
location: Plymouth Public Library, 11 North Street, Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Attorney for licensee: W. S. Stowe, Esq., Boston Edison Company, 800 Boylston Street, 36th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02199

NRC Project Director: Richard H. Wessman

Carolina Power & Light Company, et al.,
Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North Carolina

Date of application for amendments:
October 10, 1989

Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would increase the allowable primary containment leakage rates (L_a and L_t) specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1.2, Primary Containment Leakage. L_a would increase from 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at 49 psig. L_t would increase from 0.357 percent to 0.714 percent by weight of containment air per 24 hours at 25 psig. The Bases Section for Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 will be revised to reflect this change.

Basis for proposed no significant hazard consideration determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazard consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has performed an analysis addressing these standards. The analysis follows.

1. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment does not involve any physical changes, additions, modifications, or deletions to existing equipment or systems. In addition, it does not affect any operating parameters of the reactor, primary coolant system, and emergency core cooling systems. Therefore, the proposed change does not affect core damage frequency or system availability. As such, the change can not involve an increase in the probability of a previously evaluated accident.

The proposed amendment increases L_a from 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at 49 psig and L_t from 0.357 percent to 0.714 percent by weight of containment air per 24 hours at 25 psig. Chapter 15 of the Brunswick FSAR was reviewed and it was determined that Section 15.8.4, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), is affected by the proposed change. There are three analysis [SIC] to be considered in this section: offsite doses, control room doses, and environmental qualification.

The proposed amendment will result in a slight increase to offsite doses resulting from a design basis LOCA; however, this increase is not significant. At the low population zone, the doses would increase from 2.0 percent to 4.0 percent of the 10 CFR 100 limit of 25 rem for the whole body and from 3.4 percent to 6.8 percent of the 10 CFR 100 limit of 300 rem for the thyroid. At the site boundary, the whole body and thyroid doses increase from 3.2 percent to 6.4 percent and 1.3 percent to 2.6 percent of the 10 CFR 100 limits respectively.

Assuming the worst case, increasing L_a from 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent by weight per day and L_t from 0.357 percent to 0.714 percent by weight per day will result in post-accident control room doses of no more than 0.84 rem whole body, 0.82 rem thyroid, and 0.08, skin. These dose limits remain only a small fraction of the limits specified in Section 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan (5 rem whole body, 30 rem thyroid, and 30 rem skin). As such, the proposed increase in the allowable primary containment leakage rates (L_a and L_t) is acceptable from a control room habitability standpoint.

Finally, the effects of increasing the allowable primary containment leakage on environmental qualification were re-analyzed. Increasing L_a and L_t will decrease primary containment doses since it results in increased removal of activity from containment. It will, however, tend to increase the doses in the reactor building.

The equipment qualification doses in the reactor building were originally calculated for the Brunswick FSAR using the methodology of CP&L's Brunswick calculation entitled Design Report 12. The re-analysis is more realistic and removes some of the conservatism of the original analysis. It remains, however a highly conservative analysis. This analysis determined that environmental qualification doses will remain within those currently specified. As

such, the bases for equipment qualification at Brunswick is [SIC] not changed by increasing the allowable primary containment leakage rates.

Based on the above, the Company has concluded that the proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in the consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

2. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. As stated above, the proposed amendment does not involve any physical changes, additions, modifications, or deletions to existing equipment or systems. In addition, it does not affect any operating parameters of the reactor, reactor coolant system, and emergency core cooling systems.

Therefore, the proposed amendment cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The change does not affect the method by which any safety related equipment or systems perform their intended function. Nor is any safety related setpoint revised as a result of the change. Increasing L_a and L_t will result in a slight increase to offsite doses resulting from a design basis LOCA. However, the doses remain well within 10 CFR 100 limits and, therefore, are not considered to be significant. Control room doses are also increased but remain well below the applicable limits specified in Section 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan. As such, the proposed increase in the allowable primary containment leakage rates (L_a and L_t) is acceptable from a control room habitability standpoint. Finally, the effects of increasing the allowable primary containment leakage rates on environmental qualification were re-analyzed. It was determined that the bases for equipment qualification at Brunswick is not changed by increasing the allowable leakage rates.

The licensee has concluded that the proposed amendment meets the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and, therefore, involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Although there will be an increase in dose to operators and the public as a result of a LOCA, it is not significant. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
location: University of North Carolina at Wilmington, William Madison Randall Library, 601 S. College Road, Wilmington, North Carolina 28403-3297.

Attorney for licensee: R. E. Jones, General Counsel, Carolina Power & Light Company, P. O. Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

NRC Project Director: Elinor G. Adensam

Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255, Palisades Plant, Van Buren County, Michigan

Date of amendment request: April 3, 1989

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to incorporate the revisions of Section 3.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications regarding limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements as described in Generic Letter (GL) 87-09.

Specification 3.0.4 is revised to define when its provisions apply; i.e., when the affected action statements permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time, instead of defining when the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 do not apply.

The addition of a relevant Basis statement for the above change is also included.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has evaluated the proposed changes against the above three standards as required by 10 CFR 50.91(a). The Commission's staff has reviewed the licensee's evaluation and agrees with it. The licensee has concluded that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the proposed changes to the TS do not involve physical changes to the plant and exceptions to when certain RPS surveillances are required to be performed are consistent with the plant safety analysis and the STS.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No physical modification to the plant is involved in the proposed changes. The operability and surveillance

requirements for RPS instrumentation are not reduced with respect to the safety analysis.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The changes proposed by this request will permit continued operation of the plant when conformance to the action requirements of a specification provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. The addition of a Basis statement will ensure that interpretation of the TS in Section 3.0 is consistent with the intent of those TS.

The changes proposed by the licensee are consistent with the guidance contained in GL 87-09. The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination analysis. Based on this review, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Van Zoeren Library, Hope College, Holland, Michigan 49423.

Attorney for licensee: Judd L. Bacon, Esq., Consumers Power Company, 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201.

NRC Project Director: John O. Thoma, Acting.

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Date of amendment request: September 15, 1989

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would (1) correct and better define a trip setpoint and allowable value in Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3-4, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints, (2) add appropriate response times to three items in TS Table 3.3-5, Engineered Safety Features Response Times, and (3) revise the present value of the response time of an item in TS Table 3.3-5.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The first proposed change to TS Table 3.3-4, Item 4.d, Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate-High, would delete the minus signs from the numerical values for the Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Values. This editorial change is needed because the heading for Item 4.d already indicates a "negative" rate of pressure change. This clarifying editorial change is administrative and meets the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c). Therefore, it involves no significant hazards consideration.

The second revision to Item 4.d of TS Table 3.3-4 would change the entry under Trip Setpoint from "less than or equal to 100 psi/sec" to "less than or equal to 100 psi with a rate/lag function time constant greater than or equal to 50 seconds." Similarly, the entry under Allowable Values would be changed from "less than or equal to 120 psi/sec" to "less than or equal to 120 psi with a rate/lag function time constant greater than or equal to 50 seconds." This change in format and method of denoting the setpoints would correspond to the design of the as-built steam line pressure rate instrumentation and ensure its performance consistent with safety analyses.

These clarifying changes are administrative in nature and do not involve changes to the actual values themselves or the manner in which they are used. Consequently, the requested changes meet the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, therefore, would not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-5, Items 2.e, 3.e, and 4.e would specify response times of less than or equal to 4 seconds for the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation systems for each of three initiating signals: Containment Pressure-High, Pressurizer Pressure-Low-Low, and Steam Line Pressure-Low. At present, response times for Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation are specified to be "N.A.", i.e., not applicable.

The licensee's reason in the letter of September 15, 1989, for the proposed revisions to these items is as follows:

The current Technical Specification indications of N.A. for these three items (indicating that no credit was taken in the licensing basis accident analyses for those channels) are incorrect since response times have been used to minimize offsite consequences of any condition occurring while containment purge and exhaust is being used. Section 15.B.2 of the McGuire FSAR considers the case of a LOCA concurrent with lower containment pressure relief. The results of the additional offsite

dose due to this accident are presented in FSAR Table 15.0.12-1. One of the parameters used to evaluate this case is the isolation time for the Containment Air Release and Addition (VQ) System valves which are used in venting lower containment (FSAR Section 9.5.12.3 indicates that these valves auto close on a containment isolation). FSAR Table 15.B.2-1 indicates the isolation time for these valves is 4 seconds. Isolation times greater than 4 seconds (or no isolation at all) could result in offsite consequences in excess of that assumed in plant accident analysis. Therefore, the current Technical Specifications are non-conservative with respect to the licensing basis.

Consequently, the Technical Specifications are being changed to reflect the [less than or equal to] 4 second response times to ensure compliance with the assumptions used in the plant licensing basis analysis. Note that the [less than or equal to] 4 second response times are consistent with FSAR section 9.5.12.3 which indicates that these valves have a 3 second closure time, and the allowable 1 second for generating an ESF response as indicated in FSAR section 7.3.1.2.6. These changes are more conservative than the current Technical Specifications since they constitute an additional restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications.

The licensee also proposed a revision to Item 6.b of TS Table 3.3-5, which specifies the Engineered Safety Features Response Time addressing Feedwater Isolation (for Steam Generator Water Level-High-High). The requested change would lower the required response time to less than or equal to 9 seconds from the currently specified response time of less than or equal to 13 seconds. The licensee's reason in the letter of September 15, 1989, for this revision is as follows:

The licensing basis safety analysis depending on this response time is excessive feedwater flow at full power, analyzed in FSAR Section 15.1.2. FSAR Table 15.1.2-1 gives the sequence of events for this analysis. The High-High Steam Generator Water Level setpoint is reached at 27 seconds with feedwater isolation occurring at 36 seconds (i.e., 9 seconds later). For another 4 seconds in isolation time (i.e., [less than or equal to] 13 seconds), an additional mass increase beyond that assumed in the analysis could be expected. This additional feedwater level can affect the consequences of the event at power, if there has been a trip, with potential effects on reactivity control (e.g., power restoration) and/or overflow of the steam generator to cause water ingress (i.e., flooding) into the main steam lines. Additionally, it can have consequences of potentially larger importance for the event occurring from sub-critical zero power. Therefore, the current Technical Specification value of [less than or equal to] 13 seconds is less conservative than the licensing basis.

Consequently, to ensure compliance with the assumptions used in the safety analysis, the Technical Specification value is being changed to [less than or equal to] 9 seconds. Note that this 9 seconds value is consistent

with the values used for feedwater isolation on other ESF initiating signals (ref. Technical Specifications Table 3.3-5, items 2.c, 3.c, and 4.c). This change is more conservative than the current Technical Specification since it is more limiting than the [less than or equal to] 13 second value.

The information from the licensee presented above was used in the licensee's discussion of no significant hazards consideration for the proposed revisions to Items 2.e, 3.e, 4.e and 6.b of TS Table 3.3-5:

The requested changes to add appropriate ESF response times addressing Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation (for Containment Pressure-High, Pressurizer Pressure-Low-Low, and Steam Line Pressure-Low), and lower the required ESF response time addressing Feedwater Isolation (for Steam Generator Water Level-High-High), are conservative changes to ensure compliance with the plant's licensing basis safety analyses. The requested changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since they only address previously evaluated accidents' aspects, and therefore involve no accident causal mechanisms not previously evaluated. Similarly, since the requested changes conform to the previously evaluated accident assumptions, they would not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident or a significant reduction in a margin of safety (they would ensure previously evaluated accidents' consequences and margins of safety were maintained - rather, the lack of these changes would possibly increase the consequences of accidents previously evaluated and reduce the margins of safety). As these changes are more restrictive/limiting than the current Technical Specifications, they clearly involve no significant hazards considerations as they can have no adverse effect on the three standards referenced above.

The Commission's staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and significant hazards consideration and concurs with the licensee's reasons and conclusion that the proposed revisions to TS Table 3.3-5 do not involve a significant hazards consideration. Additionally, we note that one of the Commission's examples of actions not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration is (ii), "A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications, e.g., a more stringent surveillance requirement." Since the requested changes are more restrictive, this example applies to these proposed revisions.

On the basis of the conclusions discussed above for the revisions to TS Table 3.3-4 and TS Table 3.3-5, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
location: Atkins Library, University of North Carolina, Charlotte (UNCC Station), North Carolina 28223

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Albert Carr, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Date of amendment request: October 30, 1989

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise the surveillance requirements of Technical Specifications (TSs) 4.9.8.1 and 4.9.8.2, and their associated Bases to: (1) reduce the required Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system flow rate during Mode 6 (refueling) operation, when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is partially drained, from greater than or equal to 3000 gpm to greater than or equal to 1000 gpm, (2) add a requirement to ensure that the RCS temperature is maintained no more than 140° F, and (3) provide the technical justification for the revision in TS Bases 3/4.9.8.

The RHR flow rate ensures sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel at or below 140° F as required during refueling. The flow rate also ensures sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

On October 17, 1988, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal." The GL recommended that licensees implement certain actions and programmed enhancements concerning operation during shutdown cooling with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel or during conditions where such cooling would normally be provided. One of the recommended programmed enhancements was that licensees identify and submit appropriate changes to those TSs that restrict or limit the safety benefit of actions identified in GL 88-17. One action, reducing the flow rate, would aid in preventing vortexing and air entrainment in the RCS and RHR system—conditions that could damage operating pumps or cause unstable levels in the reactor vessel. As long as an RHR pump is running, even at flow rates as low as 1000 gpm, there is sufficient removal of decay heat from irradiated fuel and enough mixing in the

flow to ensure uniform boron distribution throughout the RCS. As before, the RHR system will continue to remove enough residual heat to maintain the RCS below 140° F.

The licensee also reviewed the proposed TS amendments with regard to the concerns raised by NRC Bulletin 88-04, "Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss." Specifically, operating the RHR pumps at flow rates less than 3000 gpm will increase the stress on the pump lower bearings. The licensee will monitor the bearing wear and will replace the bearings if inspection reveals significant degradation.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendments would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the reduction in flow will not keep the RHR system from fulfilling its safety functions. The system will continue to remove enough residual heat to maintain the RCS below 140° F, and continue to prevent boron dilution and boron stratification. Two RHR trains will still be required operable when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange. This will ensure that a single failure of the operating RHR train will not result in a complete loss of system capability. This revision will also reduce the probability of losing the RHR system due to vortexing or air entrainment.

The proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the lower flow rates would still allow the RHR system to fulfill its intended safety functions. Also, the requested revision would not introduce any new modes of operation and would not affect the design of the facility.

The proposed amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the proposed revision would still allow the RHR system to fulfill its intended safety

functions and would reduce the probability of rendering the RHR system inoperable.

Based on the above considerations, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested revision does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Atkins Library, University of North Carolina, Charlotte (UNCC Station), North Carolina 28223

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Albert Carr, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket No. 50-335, St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1, St. Lucie County, Florida

Date of amendment request: December 15, 1989

Description of amendment request: On July 2, 1984, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability" which presented NRC recommendations regarding improvements to the Technical Specifications to enhance diesel generator reliability. The proposed amendment would change the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS) to be consistent with the recommendations of GL 84-15. The proposed amendment would also make the St. Lucie Unit 1 TS for "Electrical Power Systems, A.C. Sources" similar to the St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee provided the following discussion regarding the above three criteria.

Criterion 1

Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been affected since the emergency diesel generators do not affect the probabilities of occurrence of accidents.

The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR have not been increased. Reducing the test frequency and modifying the starting requirements to be consistent with the diesel manufacturer's recommendations are intended to enhance diesel reliability by minimizing severe test conditions which can lead to premature failures.

The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR has been reduced since the severe test requirements have been reduced which will result in increased diesel engine reliability.

The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR have not changed since the new surveillance requirements will not affect the operation or operability of the diesels or any other safety-related equipment.

The proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in that the proposed change involves replacing fuel oil tests currently required by Technical Specifications with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements which are more effective in detecting unsatisfactory fuel oil and are simpler to perform.

The deletion of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.5 will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This LCO currently delineates what additional conditions must be satisfied to permit operation to continue, consistent with the ACTION statements for power sources, when a normal or emergency power source is not OPERABLE. It specifically prohibits operation when one division is inoperable because its normal or emergency power source is inoperable and a system, subsystem, train, component or device in another division is inoperable for another reason.

The Technical Specifications have been revised to incorporate this requirement in the ACTION statements for normal or emergency power source inoperabilities for MODES 1 through 4. In MODES 5 or 6 the ACTION statement for Specification 3.0.5 does not apply, and thus the individual ACTION statements for each applicable Limiting Condition for Operation in these MODES must be adhered to. Exceptions to [the] requirement are incorporated in specific individual Technical Specifications. Since this change is administrative in nature and no OPERABILITY requirements have been deleted, no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is involved.

The addition of new ACTION Statement f to LCO 3.8.1.1, pertaining to the administrative availability of a Unit 2 startup transformer for use by Unit 1, will not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated since the

startup transformers do not affect probability calculations or determinations.

The addition of new ACTION Statement f to LCO 3.8.1.1, pertaining to the administrative availability of a Unit 2 startup transformer for use by Unit 1, will not affect the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in that the proposed addition has been determined to meet the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 and 5, with respect to multi-unit sharing. This change incorporates a design feature already evaluated during the construction and licensing of St. Lucie Unit 2.

Criterion 2

Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The possibility of a new or different kind of accident other than that analyzed in the FSAR has not been created since the change affects the starting and loading practices during testing only and has no impact on actual accident analyses. The possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any analyzed in the FSAR has not been increased. In fact, the probability of equipment malfunction has been reduced as the result of the improved testing conditions and frequency of testing as discussed in Generic Letter 84-15.

The proposed amendments would replace fuel oil tests currently required by the Technical Specifications with different tests which are more effective for ensuring quality fuel oil. These changes are:

(a) The proposed testing requirements would improve the capability to detect delivery of diesel fuel contaminated with gasoline or jet fuel (JP-4) by adding a test for flash point.

(b) The proposed Clear and Bright test is more sensitive for detecting water and sediment than the test which is currently required.

(c) The accelerated oxidation stability test which predicts the tendency of the fuel to form particulates during storage would be replaced by a different test performed more frequently which actually measures particulates in the fuel.

(d) Because proposed tests for incoming fuel shipments will ensure its quality, periodic testing would only be required for the parameters which can change during storage. Thus, certain test requirements would be deleted.

(e) Because of the high degree of protection obtained by the tests for incoming fuel prior to addition to the storage tanks, the proposed relaxation of the time limit for complete fuel specification testing from 14 days to 31 days is insignificant.

(f) Since comparative gravity, as proposed, can detect contamination by jet fuel (Jet A) and other types of contamination are detected by tests other than viscosity, viscosity testing is not required if gravity is determined using this method.

(g) Under the proposed amendments, analysis for sulfur using any one of the three generally accepted methods would be allowed.

(h) Administrative changes would be made to reference up-to-date industry standards.

(i) The requirement to periodically remove accumulated water from the day tanks would be extended to include the storage tanks.

The addition of ACTION Statement f does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated in that the inoperability of the offsite power source is assumed in the accident analyses on record.

Criterion 3

Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by the proposed changes. The changes in the testing requirements do not affect the capability of the diesels to perform their function. The purpose of the change is to increase the diesel engine reliability.

The deletion of LCO 3.0.5 does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety since the requirements for normal or emergency power source OPERABILITY have been moved from LCO 3.0.5 to the ACTION statements for A.C. Power Systems in MODES 1 through 4. Exceptions to the Operability requirements in MODES 5 and 6 currently permitted by LCO 3.0.5 have been moved to the individual specifications.

The addition of ACTION Statement f to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications does not involve a significant reduction in any margin of safety in that this change is considered to be administrative in nature. The design of the offsite power network was evaluated during the construction and licensing of St. Lucie Unit 2, and was found to be in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 5 and 17 with respect to multi-unit sharing. As stated in the bases for the St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications, "the ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associate distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source."

Based upon the above, we have determined that the amendment request does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the [possibility] of a new or different [kind of] accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, and therefore does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed changes to the TS involve no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
Location: Indian River Junior College

Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Fort Pierce, Florida 33450

Attorney for licensee: Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman and Holtzinger, 1615 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Florida Power and Light Company,
Docket No. 50-251, Turkey Point Plant,
Unit 4, Dade County, Florida

Date of amendment request:
November 17, 1989

Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would delete License Condition 3.J which applied the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspection program to Turkey Point Unit 4. In early 1988, the IAEA informed the U.S. Department of State that Turkey Point Unit 4 had been deleted from its safeguards inspection program. In a December 2, 1988, letter from the NRC, Florida Power and Light (FPL) was informed that the license condition was terminated and could be deleted. The purpose of this license amendment is to complete the administrative paperwork to remove an obsolete license condition from the Turkey Point license.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

An evaluation of the proposed change in accordance with the above three standards has determined the following:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because neither the original imposition of the license condition nor its deletion adversely affects the design, analysis or operation of any structure, system or component required for the safety of Turkey Point Unit 4. All IAEA activities at Turkey Point Unit 4 have been terminated. Therefore, the license condition has been satisfied and this change, which deletes the completed condition from the license, is only administrative in nature.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because there is no adverse impact on the design, analysis or operation of structures, systems or components required for safety at Turkey Point Unit 4. The change deletes a completed license condition and is only administrative in nature.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the change is administrative in nature and does not relate to or modify the safety margins which have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

Based on the above evaluation of no significant hazards consideration and that the NRC staff has previously informed FPL that the need for the license condition no longer exists, the staff believes that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92 have been met. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Environmental and Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199

Attorney for licensee: Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman and Holtzer, P.C., 1615 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-220, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Oswego County, New York

Date of amendment request: June 20, 1988, as supplemented October 19, 1989

Description of amendment request: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-63, requests that certain changes be made to the Technical Specifications (TS) set forth in Appendix A to that license. The changes concern the suppression chamber water level instrumentation and several administrative changes. The suppression chamber water level instrumentation was added to TS 3/4.6.11 "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" in Amendment No. 72 on April 1, 1985. TS 3/4.3.2 and 3/4.6.11 provide limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements (SR) for this instrumentation which is essentially equivalent to that also provided in TS 3/4.6.2; specifically: TS 3/4.6.2.a, 3.6.2.a(12), Tables 3.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.1 and Bases 3/4.6.2. Therefore, the licensee's basis for removal is that since TS 3/4.3.2 and 3/4.6.11 provide the requirement to monitor water level and the associated

LCO's and SR's the TS 3/4.6.2.a, 3.6.2.a(12) and Tables 3.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.1 may be removed. The Bases for TS 3/4.6.2 and 3/4.6.11 would be revised to reflect these changes.

The licensee proposes to remove these requirements from TS 3/4.6.2 and to rely on TS 3/4.3.2 and 3/4.6.11 requirements for this instrumentation and thereby to provide clearer and more straightforward direction regarding this parameter. The licensee proposes that this change will also improve readability and operator interpretation and will be consistent with staff guidance regarding accident monitoring instruments.

The licensee has also proposed administrative changes which include (a) the renumbering of Tables 3.6.2.m and 4.6.2.m to account for the removal of the preceding Tables 3.6.2.l and 4.6.2.l and (b) inclusion in the TS table of contents pages of the titles of sections 3/4.2.6 and 3/4.6.3 which are consistent with that already provided in TS Sections 3/4.2.6 and 3/4.6.3.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has provided the following analysis:

The proposed changes to delete the requirements for the suppression chamber water level instrumentation from Specification 3.6.2 will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated since these requirements currently exist in Specifications 4.3.2 and 4.6.11. The daily suppression chamber water level check required by existing Specification 4.3.2 provides an equivalent determination of acceptable operability for this instrumentation to the once/day sensor check being deleted in Table 4.6.21. The deletion of the requirement in Specification 4.6.2 to perform an instrument calibration every six months for the suppression chamber water level monitor will be replaced by the requirement in Specification 4.6.11 to perform an instrument calibration once during each major refueling outage. This change is consistent with the channel calibration frequency recommended by the NRC in Generic Letter 83-36, "NUREG-737 Technical Specifications" and therefore, will have no impact on the probability or

consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not involve the addition of any new hardware or equipment to the plant nor do these changes affect the design or operation of the suppression chamber water level instrumentation. Therefore, these changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not affect the operation of the suppression chamber water level instrumentation or its setpoint. The deletion of the once/day sensor check in Specification 4.6.21 will not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety, as the daily suppression chamber water level check required by existing Specification 4.3.2 provides an equivalent surveillance requirement. The decrease in the surveillance frequency for the instrument channel calibration from once every six months to once during each refueling outage will not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety, as our experience with the calibration of these instruments has shown that a calibration once during each refueling outage is adequate. The changes will provide the correct specification for action to be taken if the suppression chamber water level instrumentation becomes inoperable. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the application for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

The changes to renumber pages and to include TS section titles in the table of contents are administrative in nature. The Commission has provided guidance for the application of criteria for no significant hazards consideration determination by providing examples of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations (51 FR 7751). These examples include: Example (i) "A purely administrative change to technical specification: For example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, corrections of an error, or a change in nomenclature." The proposed changes, as discussed above, are examples of such administrative changes. Since these proposed changes are encompassed by an example for which no significant hazard exists, the staff has made a proposed determination that they involve no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Attorney for licensee: Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire, Conner & Wetterhahn, Suite 1050, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation,
Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, Scriba, New
York

Date of amendment request: August 3, 1988

Description of amendment request:

The proposed amendment would revise Section 3/4.3.3, Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation, Section 3/4.3.5, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation, and the associated basis to reflect revised design calculations. The Technical Specifications currently specify the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) levels at which HPCS pump suction and RCIC pump suction transfer from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the suppression pool. However, pump suction pressure provides a better means of addressing suction transfer from the HPCS and RCIC systems than CST level. The actuation pressures remain constant at all flow conditions while the CST levels vary. The proposed change would revise the Technical Specifications to reflect the setpoint of the pressure switch which controls suction transfer.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The licensee has provided the following analysis:

The proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The minimum required submergence levels to prevent vortexing in the tank have not changed. The Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints proposed in the amendment will assure actuation occurs above the minimum submergence levels under all flow conditions. As a result, HPCS and RCIC pump performance will not be affected. The response of the HPCS and RCIC systems to previously analyzed

accidents is not impacted. Therefore, operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Pump suction pressure provides a better means of addressing suction transfer of the HPCS and RCIC systems than specifying a tank level. The design of the HPCS and RCIC systems has not been changed, and the performance of systems and components remains within the bounds of previous assumptions. Therefore, the operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The Analytical Limits specified will assure that actuation occurs above the minimum submergence depth under all flow conditions. The Allowable Values proposed provide sufficient margin between the Analytical Limits and the Allowable Values to account for instrument and calibration accuracies. Drift is accounted for between the Allowable Values and Nominal Trip Setpoints such that the Allowable Values will not be exceeded during a calibration interval. Therefore, operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in any margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the application for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Attorney for licensee: Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Conner & Wetterhahn, Suite 1050, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation,
Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, Oswego
County, New York

Date of amendment request: July 28 and December 14, 1989

Description of amendment request:

The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specifications Section 3/4.9.7, Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool. The current Technical Specifications do not allow loads in excess of 1000 pounds to travel over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool racks. Refueling

operations require movement of the spent fuel pool gates weighing over 1000 pounds from their installed position in the transfer canal to their storage location on the side of the spent fuel pool. Eventually, as the number of fuel assemblies stored in the fuel pool increases, the pool gates will travel over the stored fuel assemblies. The change to Technical Specifications Section 3.9.7 would permit the travel of loads in excess of 1000 pounds over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool racks provided these loads are handled by a single failure-proof handling system. The proposed amendment would modify Surveillance Requirements 4.9.7 accordingly.

The staff requested additional information regarding the previously existing accident analyses relative to this issue. The licensee provided the following discussion in response:

Movement of heavy loads and the possibility of an accidental load drop are addressed and evaluated in Appendix 9C of the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 USAR, "The Control of Heavy Loads at Nine Mile Point Unit 2". Section 3 of this appendix discusses compliance with Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.6 of NUREG 0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". In accordance with NUREG 0612, compliance with these sections provides assurance that the potential for a load drop is negligible. As discussed in the Amendment Application dated July 26, 1989, and documented in Appendix 9C of the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 USAR, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 meets the guidelines of NUREG 0612. The transfer of the spent fuel pool gates is discussed in Appendix 9C and the safe load paths are illustrated in Figure 5-2.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The licensee provided the following analysis in its initial submittal dated July 16, 1989:

1) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the probability of an accidental load drop while handling heavy loads over the spent fuel pool is extremely small and within the guidelines of NUREG-0612. Interlocks continue to provide assurance that the spent fuel cask cannot

accidentally drop into the spent fuel pool. The single failure-proof aspects of the polar crane design include complete redundancy for sheaves, ropes, reeving, reducing gears, holding brakes, and other load path components of the main hoist.

2) The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. When handling a spent fuel shipping cask, the spent fuel pool and any stored fuel assemblies are isolated from a postulated fuel cask handling accident. Travel restrictions on the Reactor Building Polar Crane ensure the cask will not travel over the spent fuel pool. The function and performance of systems and components on the Reactor Building Polar Crane, as well as the seismic qualification of the Reactor Building Polar Crane, have not been affected. Therefore, the Reactor Building Polar Crane is still in compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements.

3) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Loads in excess of 1000 pounds over the spent fuel pool will be handled by a single failure-proof handling system. Thus, the probability of a load drop is sufficiently small such that the activity release from a fuel handling accident assumed in the safety analyses will not be affected. The dropping of a load weighing less than the nominal weight of a fuel assembly (i.e., 1000 pounds) would result in activity release limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly and could not result in a critical array due to distortion of the fuel. This is consistent with the assumptions contained in the safety analyses.

In addition, the licensee stated in its supplemental response of December 14, 1989 that since movement of the fuel pool gates is already fully evaluated in Appendix 9C of the UFSAR, the proposed change will not increase the probability of a previously evaluated accident nor will it create the possibility of a previously unevaluated accident. The change is required to permit operation in a previously evaluated mode. There is no significant reduction in any margin of safety since the existing analysis demonstrates that the probability of a load drop is negligible.

The staff agrees with the licensee's analyses. Therefore, the staff proposes that the amendment will not involve a significant hazards determination.

Local Public Document Room
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NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation,
Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, Scriba, New York

Date of amendment request: August 17, 1989

Description of amendment request: As stated in the licensee's application and in the updated PSAR, the portion of the nuclear boiler Leak Detection System (LDS) in the main steam tunnel is used to detect leakage from the main steam line and to initiate signals used for automatic closure of the main steam isolation valves. The sensitivity of the portions of the LDS in the main steam tunnel and lead enclosure area, as described in the UFSAR, is such that it would detect increases in ambient air temperatures which would be equivalent to a reactor coolant leakage into the area of 25 gpm.

The proposed amendment would change Technical Specifications 3.3.2 and 4.3-2 to increase the Trip Setpoints and Allowable values for high absolute and differential temperature isolation instrumentation systems in the main steam tunnel. In early July 1989, the high temperatures existing in the Main Steam Line Lead Enclosure resulted in Nine Mile Point Unit 2 operating in half isolation condition. The proposed change would increase the operating margin and reduce unnecessary challenges to the plant shutdown system.

Therefore, the licensee's proposed changes reflect the need to increase the assumption for the initial ambient space temperatures, based on actual measured data during the plant's first operating cycle, while maintaining the sensitivity required to detect a leakage of 25 gpm in these spaces.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has provided the following analysis:

The LDS instrumentation in the main steam line tunnel isolates the Main Steam Isolation Valves upon sensing a steam leak of 25 gpm. The proposed setpoint values provide the

same level of protection against a main steam line break as the existing values. The proposed setpoints will increase operating margin, and reduce unnecessary challenges to the plant shutdown systems. Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The qualification of safety-related equipment in the main steam tunnel has been evaluated against the increase in maximum normal design and post-accident temperatures. Component qualified life has been adjusted accordingly, thereby assuring that instrumentation response to previously evaluated accidents will not be adversely affected. Further, all safety-related systems and components remain within their applicable design limits. Thus, system and component performance is not adversely affected by this change, thereby assuring that design capabilities of those systems and components are not challenged in a manner not previously evaluated so as to create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed change increases the existing Setpoints and Allowable Values for Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperatures. The change in the process safety limit is a result of utilizing as-tested and as-built data, and does not reduce the safety margin assumed in the analysis. The allowances provided between the Process Safety Limits and the Allowable Values and the Setpoints, have been evaluated against the increased temperatures. The reduction in allowances will not affect the ability of the instrumentation system to actuate prior to the temperature in the main steam tunnel reaching a process safety limit. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, the staff proposes to determine that the application for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Attorney for licensee: Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Conner & Wetterhahn, Suite 1050, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20006.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation,
Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, Scriba, New York

Date of amendment request: November 17, 1989

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.5

which provides the operability and surveillance requirements for snubbers installed at Nine Mile Point Unit 2. The proposed revisions incorporate the most recent recommendations contained in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers document, "Examination and Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers) OM4, Revision 2, Draft 7 (Editorial 5/88)." This document has been endorsed by the Commission. By the proposed change the three sample plans currently contained in Technical Specification 4.7.5.e would be replaced by two sample plans in accordance with the guidelines of OM4. The two sample plans provide reduced testing and, therefore, a reduction of man-rem exposure while still providing adequate assurance of snubber reliability. Accordingly, Figure 4.7.5-1 would be revised to reflect the changes to Technical Specification 4.7.5.e. The proposed amendment would also revise Technical Specification 4.7.5.g to add unexpected transient events as a cause of locked-up snubbers requiring that all snubbers of the same type, subject to the same defect, be functionally tested. The proposed amendment would replace the title "Inspection Types" currently used in Technical Specification 4.7.5.a with "Snubber Types" to be consistent with the terminology used in Technical Specification 4.7.5.a.

Additionally, Technical Specification 4.7.5.b would be changed to describe more accurately what time period is implied by the terms "first refueling outage." Section 4.7.5.b would read "first refueling outage (18 months $\pm$ 25%)."

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has provided the following analysis in its November 17, 1989 submittal:

(1) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated. Reducing the percentage of additional snubbers to be tested from 10% to 5% for "10 percent plan"

does not undermine the effectiveness of this surveillance. The initial test remains the same and is sufficient to provide an adequate sampling of the snubbers. This change reduces the amount of additional testing without affecting the previously established confidence level.

Deleting the "reject" line from "37 plan" does not affect acceptance of the snubber population because snubbers must continue to be tested until the acceptance criteria are met or until all snubbers have been tested. Deletion of the "reject" line from the "37 plan" also makes the "55 plan" unnecessary. Statistical studies indicate that these changes do not reduce the previously established confidence level and thus have no effect on the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and other safety related systems under dynamic loading. Hence the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents are not significantly increased.

(2) The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accidents previously evaluated because it involves no changes to system design bases or system function and does not introduce any new variables beyond those previously considered.

(3) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Although the proposed amendment does not involve changes in surveillance frequency or operating conditions, they do involve changes in surveillance methods and sample size but no individual acceptance criteria. However, statistical evidence indicates that while the probability of acceptance of a bad snubber population under the proposed amendment still exists, it does not represent a significant reduction to the margin of safety.

Based on the above, the staff proposes that the amendment will not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

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NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

Dates of amendment request: July 21, 1989, September 21, 1989, and December 11, 1989

Description of amendment request: Technical Specifications 3/4.8.1.1 and 3/4.8.1.2, A.C. Sources, ensure that sufficient power is available to supply safety related equipment that is required for the safe shutdown of the plant or

mitigation and control of accident conditions. One way this is accomplished is by maintaining the fuel oil storage volume requirements of these specifications which is 42,500 gallons for specification 3/4.8.1.1 (Modes 1-4) and 30,000 gallons for specification 3/4.8.1.2 (Modes 5 & 6).

On April 28, 1989 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) recognized that the current design basis calculations under ANSI standard N195-1976 yielded fuel oil storage requirements of 47,100 gallons in Modes 1 thru 4 and 33,200 gallons in Modes 5 and 6. Therefore, it is requested that the fuel oil storage system requirements be changed from 42,500 gallons to 47,100 gallons for Specification 3/4.8.1.1 and from 30,000 gallons to 33,200 gallons for Specification 3/4.8.1.2, and that a change to the specification Bases 3/4.8, Electrical Power Systems, be made to clarify the origin of the fuel oil system volume requirements.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

SCE&G has determined that no significant hazard considerations exist as explained by the following:

1. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously [evaluated]. This is due to the change imposing more restrictive limits than currently exist thus relaxing, [SIC] the potential for, and, [SIC] the results of, any of the previously evaluated accidents involving the operability of the Diesel Generators.

2. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different [type] of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the increase in the Fuel Oil Storage requirement ensures a higher level of reliability for the Diesel Generators.

3. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety since the increase in fuel oil storage requirements represents a more restrictive limit than currently exist [SIC] and, therefore, represents and [SIC] enhancement to safety.

The SCE&G has concluded that the proposed amendment meets the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and,

therefore, involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
location: Fairfield County Library,
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Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, P.O. Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Elinor G. Adensam

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,
South Carolina Public Service Authority,
Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer
Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield
County, South Carolina

Dates of amendment request: July 27, 1989 and September 21, 1989

Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment revises Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2 of Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, "A. C. Sources," with respect to diesel fuel oil storage, monitoring, sampling and analysis. The proposed change will add a surveillance requirement to check for and remove any accumulated water in the fuel oil storage tanks every 31 days, and will specify that samples will be obtained and analyzed in accordance with ASTM-D4057-81 and ASTM-D975-81.

For the proper operation of the diesel generators, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. Periodically and upon replenishment of the fuel oil, a surveillance is performed to establish that the diesel generator fuel oil meets the NRC guidelines on kinematic viscosity, water and sediment content, and specific gravity per Regulatory Guide 1.137, Revision 1, "Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators" (October 1979). This proposed change is consistent with NUREG-0452, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor," and will ensure the proper quality fuel oil for operation of the diesel generator.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility

in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has reviewed the amendment request and determined that should this request be implemented it will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. No change in the design or function of any plant system is proposed. The proposed standard for diesel fuel oil acceptability will assure that so far as the fuel is concerned, the Emergency Diesel Generator System (EDGS) will continue to function reliably and can continue to be credited for operation in those instances presently required in the safety analysis. The fuel oil surveillance program will continue to ensure that an adequate supply of quality fuel oil is maintained onsite.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No change in EDGS operation or reliability will result from the proposed change in allowable fuel properties. The proposed change is limited to the sampling and analysis of diesel fuel oil.

3. Create a significant reduction in a margin of safety. A comparison between acceptability standards, [SIC] for Grade No. 2 Diesel Fuel Oil between ASTM-D975-77 Table 1 and ASTM-D975-81 Table 1 indicates no difference.

The licensee has concluded that the proposed amendment meets the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and, therefore, involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
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Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, P.O. Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Elinor G. Adensam

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,
South Carolina Public Service Authority,
Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer
Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield
County, South Carolina

Dates of amendment request: August 10, 1989 and December 11, 1989

Description of amendment request:
The amendment is administrative in nature in that it renumbers Section 3/4.7.11 to 3/4.7.9 to agree with related changes contained within Amendment 79 to the Facility Operating License.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has provided the following no significant hazards consideration determination:

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated because the administrative change does not affect plant operation in any manner.

The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated because the proposed change is administrative in nature and no physical alterations of plant configuration or changes to setpoints or operating parameters are proposed.

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The amendment is administrative in nature in that it renumbers Section 3/4.7.11 to 3/4.7.9 to agree with related changes contained within Amendment 79 to the Facility Operating License.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, the licensee had determined that the proposed change poses no significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
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Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, P.O. Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Elinor G. Adensam

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request:
September 19, 1989 and December 11, 1989

Description of amendment request:
Technical Specification 4.4.5.4.a.10, "Acceptance Criteria-Repaired Tube," presently allows steam generator tube repair using the Combustion Engineering sleeve process. The requested Technical Specification change will allow the use of B&W sleeves for steam generator tube repair. The change requires referencing B&W topical report BAW-2045P, "Recirculating Steam Generator Kinetic Sleeve Qualification for 3/4 Inch O. D. Tubes," in Technical Specification Section 4.4.5.4.a.10. The topical was submitted to the NRC by a letter dated June 9, 1988, from Mr. James H. Taylor of Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) to Mr. L. C. Shao of the NRC. A supplement to the original B&W submittal was made on December 12, 1988 which contained answers to NRC questions and transmitted a non-proprietary version of the topical. The currently allowed Combustion Engineering sleeve process will be retained in the Technical Specifications as an option.

The basis for steam generator tube surveillance and repair is to ensure that the structural integrity of the tubes is maintained. The sleeving process is one method of dispositioning a degraded tube. The advantage of sleeving versus plugging is that the tube is allowed to remain in service. The structural integrity of the tube is maintained with minimal reduction in flow and heat transfer capabilities. Therefore, the repaired tube functions in essentially the same manner as the original tube.

The proposed Technical Specification change is requested to provide SCE&G with another alternative for handling degraded tubes. The B&W sleeve is qualified for two lengths. The shorter sleeve may be utilized in all steam generator tubes and is, therefore, more versatile than the currently approved Combustion Engineering sleeve.

Also, an editorial numbering/title revision is being made to Section 4.4.5.4.a.6 to more clearly delineate tube versus sleeve plugging or repair limits by adding item 4.4.5.4.1.7 and renumbering subsequent items.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed

amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The purpose of a sleeve is to repair a degraded steam generator tube in order to maintain the function and integrity of the tube. The sleeve functions in essentially the same manner as the original tube. B&W topical report BAW-2045P describes in detail the analytical methods used for design and qualification of the B&W sleeve. Table 4.1.1, "Summary of RSG Sleeve Requirements," lists the specifications (mainly ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code requirements) used in design, procurement and qualification of the sleeve. Table 4.2.2, "Steam Generator Design Transients," summarizes the transients used to establish sleeve loading.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, the licensee provided a determination that the proposed change poses no significant hazard as defined by 10 CFR 50.92 as follows:

1) The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The steam generator tube rupture accident is the only previously evaluated accident which may have been significantly affected by this change. However, the steam generator sleeve has been analyzed and tested to the operating and design conditions of the original tube as documented in BAW-2045P. The topical report contains the design verification results from the analysis and confirmation testing performed on the sleeve. The probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents is not increased by this change since the sleeve meets the original tube design conditions and the structural integrity of the tube is maintained by the sleeving process.

In addition, the sleeve is less susceptible to the identified stress corrosion failure mechanisms of the original tube because of the use of an improved material, Alloy 690 Inconel, and the B&W specified installation process. The continued integrity of the sleeve will be verified by the Technical Specification inspection requirements and the sleeve will be plugged in accordance with Technical Specification 4.4.5.4.1.7 evaluation and acceptance criteria.

2) The numbering/title revision is purely editorial in nature and has no technical impact.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The purpose of the sleeve is to repair a degraded steam generator tube in order to maintain the function and integrity of the tube. The sleeve functions in essentially the same manner as the original tube and has been analyzed and tested for the steam generator design conditions. Repairing the tube to a serviceable condition utilizing this sleeving process does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident since the sleeve is a passive component with failure mechanisms that should be similar to the original tube.

3) The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The potential for primary to secondary leakage is reduced by the addition of a steam generator tube sleeve. Also, the structural integrity of the tube is maintained by the sleeve and sleeve/tube weld.

The proposed sleeving technique provides an increased margin of safety over plugging the tube and removing it from service. The effect of sleeve installation on steam generator performance was analyzed for heat transfer, flow restriction and steam generation capacity. The results show that plugging one tube is equivalent to the heat transfer reduction of sleeving 48 tubes, the primary flow reduction of sleeving 20 tubes, and loss of steam generation capacity of sleeving 40 tubes. Therefore, sleeving provides additional margin when compared to the plugging alternative.

The licensee has concluded that the proposed amendment meets the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and, therefore, involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Fairfield County Library, Garden and Washington Streets, Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180

Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, P.O. Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Elinor G. Adensam

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request:
November 20, 1989

Description of amendment request:
Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.1.5, "Main Steam Isolation Valves" (MSIV), surveillance requirements limits the stroke time to a maximum of five seconds when the valves are being

tested to satisfy specification 4.0.5. The licensee proposed to change this limit to seven seconds.

The MSIV's are required to be operable to ensure that no more than one Steam Generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. The closure time of the surveillance is specified for consistency with the assumptions in the accident analyses.

The MSIV's were designed with a closure time of five seconds. This short time essentially prevents any stroke time degradation from being tolerated since the TS limit is also five seconds. Because there is no allowance for stroke time degradation, a meaningful trend of valve performance cannot be established. The change to seven seconds would allow for problem analysis and pre-planning of corrective maintenance. The change to a seven second limit on stroke time would also remain consistent with actuation times assumed in the accident analysis which are 10 second actuation time for Main Steam Isolation on Reactor Building Pressure, High-2 and 10 second actuation time for Main Steam Isolation on Steam Line Pressure, Low.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has concluded that the proposed amendment meets the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and, therefore, involves no significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

This change does not affect [i.e., involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of] any previously evaluated accidents. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) response times required by Specification 3.3.2 ensures that actuation times are within those assumed in the accident analyses. The most limiting ESFAS response time requirement is Reactor Building Pressure High-2 response time of nine seconds. The limit being changed does not affect ESFAS response time limits. However, the seven second limit remains consistent with the ESFAS response time requirements; therefore, it also remains

consistent with the assumptions of previously evaluated accidents.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated because the change does not alter any plant hardware, and the allowed stroke time addressed in this change is bounded by the actuation time requirement of Specification 3.3.2 which assures previously evaluated assumptions are met. Therefore, the change remains within the criteria of previously evaluated accidents.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety due to the fact the Technical Specification Basis for the limit is to keep the valve stroke time within the assumptions used in the accident analysis and the new limit remains within those assumptions.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Fairfield County Library, Garden and Washington Streets, Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180

Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, P.O. Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Elinor G. Adensam

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: November 20, 1989

Description of amendment request: Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.6, "Accident Monitoring Instruments," presently requires two channels of Reactor Building RHR Sump Level (Item 13 in Table 3.3-10 and 4.3-7) and two channels of Reactor Building Level (Item 14 in Tables 3.3-10 and 4.3-7). South Carolina Electric & Gas Company requests a deletion of "Reactor Building Level" from the tables and modification of the "Reactor Building RHR Sump Level" to read "Reactor Building/RHR Sump Level."

The Technical Specifications bases for accident monitoring instruments are to provide sufficient information from selected parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident and to remain consistent with recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97.

The proposed change in Technical Specifications is requested as part of a planned modification. This modification

integrates the Reactor Building RHR Level Instrument and the Reactor Building Level Instrument into a new single instrument. This will be done for each channel.

The new instrument provides indication over the range previously provided by the combination of both of the old instruments. The modification accomplishes two positive benefits. One being the removal of a piece of equipment from inside containment without removing its function. The other benefit is the new instrument is less susceptible to environmental hazards.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Upon review of the proposed amendment, SCE&G determined that no significant hazard considerations exist for the following reasons:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated since the information available from accident monitoring instruments has not changed and the affected instruments are "indication only" instruments.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any evaluated previously because the change involves passive components only.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety due to the fact that the modification results in a more reliable and accurate indication of the selected parameters.

The licensee has concluded that the proposed amendment meets the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and, therefore, involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with Items 1 and 3 of the licensee's analysis. However, with respect to Item 2, the staff has concluded that the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated because the

change limits the instrument's susceptibility to environmental hazards because it is being moved outside containment. The function of the instrument remains unchanged. The range previously provided by the combination of both of the old instruments will be covered by the new instrument. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room

location: Fairfield County Library, Garden and Washington Streets, Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180

Attorney for licensee: Randolph R. Mahan, South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, P.O. Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218

NRC Project Director: Elinor G. Adensam

Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, San Diego County, California

Date of amendment request: October 19, 1989

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposed to revise the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Technical Specifications. The proposed request would revise TS 3/4.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," and TS 3/4.3.3.1, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation," to remove requirements relating to the iodine/particulate channels of the fuel handling isolation system (FHIS) airborne radiation monitors.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided the following no significant hazards consideration determination:

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change would eliminate the iodine/particulate channels from the FHIS airborne radiation monitors. In the event of a fuel handling accident, an FHIS signal from two independent, redundant airborne radiation monitors located in the exhaust ducts (RT-7822-1 and RT-7823-2) automatically starts the post-accident cleanup units and fuel pool pump room cooling units and isolates the Fuel Handling Building by closing isolation dampers and cutting off the normal ventilation supply and exhaust subsystem. Presently, the initiating circuits for each of the subsystems are provided with two independent sensors to

detect gaseous and airborne iodine/particulate radioactivity. The FHIS can also be manually initiated from the control room. The proposed change would result in the use of only the gaseous channels for alarm and isolation.

The conclusion of the analysis of a postulated fuel handling accident is discussed in FSAR Section 15.7 and evaluated in NRC Safety Evaluation Report Section 15.4.4. Both the analyses presented in the FSAR and the SER evaluation assume an instantaneous release of iodine and fission gases into the spent fuel pool area. The offsite dose calculations assume isolation and initiation of the post accident cleanup filter system at the onset of the event. The noble gas setpoint is set as close to background as possible without spurious actuation. Noble gases liberate freely in the event of a fuel handling accident, are more mobile, and are less likely to be captured or removed from the process stream than iodine or particulates. A postulated fuel handling accident will result in actuation on noble gas prior to, and without the iodine/particulate channel. The noble gas channel responds instantaneously while the iodine/particulate channel requires accumulation time to reach the setpoint established in the Technical Specifications.

The proposed change reduces the diversity of parameters used to initiate an FHIS from four channels (two iodine/particulate and two noble gas channels) to two noble gas channels. The independence and redundancy of the noble gas channels (one each on RT-7822-1 and RT-7823-2) continue to provide the necessary degree of assurance that the monitors will perform the required function of initiating an FHIS on high radiation level, instrument failure, or loss of power. The use of noble gas detection alone to initiate the protective action is consistent with the requirements of Standard Review Plan 11.5.

Continuous sampling for iodine and particulates in the effluent stream is provided by the Plant Vent Stack monitor. The effluent stream path, from the Fuel Handling Building, is into the Plant Vent Stack. Continuous sampling takes place in the Plant Vent Stack. As the Fuel Handling Building sample is combined with the gaseous radwaste system and auxiliary building, under normal circumstances, no specific accounting for the source of the activity occurs. Under unusually high conditions, i.e., elevated readings at the Plant Vent Stack, plant investigation to identify the source is initiated by operations personnel.

Therefore, this proposed change will not increase the probability or consequences of a fuel handling accident.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not add new equipment to the plant, but would delete equipment which solely performs the function of Fuel Handling Building isolation and post accident cleanup system actuation. Since these functions continue to be performed by the noble gas channels, the proposed change

does not alter the previously analyzed fuel handling accident. Since new equipment is not added and existing process and effluent paths remain unchanged, the proposed change does not create new ways in which an accident can be initiated. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change places a greater reliance on the noble gas channel for initiation of Fuel Handling Building isolation and cleanup system actuation. However, iodine/particulates would not be present post accident without noble gas. The noble gas setpoint is set as close to background as possible without spurious actuation. Noble gases liberate freely in the event of a fuel handling accident, are more mobile, and are less likely to be captured or removed from the process stream than iodine or particulates. A postulated fuel handling accident will therefore result in actuation noble gas, prior to and, without the iodine/particulate channel. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a significant reduction in the safety margin.

The NRC staff has reviewed this analysis and, based on that review, it appears that the three criteria are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: General Library, University of California, P.O. Box 19557, Irvine, California 92713.

Attorney for licensee: Charles R. Kocher, Assistant General Counsel, and James Beoletto, Esquire, Southern California Edison Company, P.O. Box 800, Rosemead, California 91770.

NRC Project Director: George W. Knighton

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas

Date of amendment request: November 30, 1989

Description of amendment request: The proposed changes revise Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 to change a note at the bottom of page 3/4.4-6 to add the additional criterion of ensuring the reactor vessel water level is above the vessel flange before the running Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump can be stopped in Mode 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled. In addition, the proposed changes would revise Technical Specifications 4.9.8.1 and 4.9.8.2 to decrease the required flow rate of the running RHR pump. Finally, the proposed change would revise Technical

Specification 3.5.4, changing the mode applicability so that the safety injection pumps would be immediately available to the operators should RHR cooling be lost when the reactor coolant level is below the vessel flange.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The licensee provided an analysis that addressed the above three standards in the amendment application.

Standard 1 - Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated

These changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The change to the RHR flow rate reduces the probability of a loss of decay heat removal due to vortexing and cavitation, while the probability of accidents analyzed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) are unaffected. A reduction of RHR flow could potentially affect decay heat removal rate, boron stratification and the boron dilution accident analysis. An evaluation concluded that the consequences of these accidents are not increased. Allowing the safety injection pumps to be operable affects the cold over-pressure analysis. Whenever the reactor coolant level is below the vessel flange, there is a minimum empty volume of approximately 17,000 gallons. These pumps would only be used in an emergency situation, while attempting to return an RHR pump to service. This empty space will allow the operators sufficient room to provide cooling to the core and still not completely fill the reactor coolant system.

Standard 2 - Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From any Accident Previously Evaluated

These changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The WCCS Technical Specifications do not contain provisions to minimize the potential for vortexing and air entrainment in the RHR system which may occur during RCS operation under certain conditions. Although the current requirements for minimum 2800 gpm flow rate is conservative for decay heat removal and uniform boron mixing, it is clear that minimizing the potential for vortexing was not considered when the minimum flow rate requirement was established.

Revisions to Technical Specifications

4.9.8.1 and 4.9.8.2 are proposed so that RHR system flow rate may be reduced to the greater of the flow required to maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140° F or 1000 gpm. Although a reduced flow rate is not required for prevention of vortexing and air entrainment for water level above the reactor flange greater than 23 feet (Technical Specification 4.9.8.1), this change is being made for consistency to minimize operator confusion and human factors problems. Allowing the Safety Injection Pumps to be operable gives the Operators added flexibility in providing cooling to the core whenever RHR is lost. The requirement that the reactor coolant level be below the vessel flange prior to making the pumps operable, provides a sufficient empty volume to not completely fill the reactor coolant system.

Standard 3 - Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin of Safety

These changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Operation with the RCS partially drained in MODES 5 and 6 is necessary for required inspection and maintenance on RCS components such as reactor coolant pumps and steam generators. A reduced RHR flow rate would provide a greater margin to vortexing and preclude an inadvertent loss of decay heat removal capability due to air entrainment and cavitation of the RHR pumps. The likelihood of vortexing at the suction of the RHR pumps could be lowered by reducing the RHR flow rate.

The proposed minimum flow rate of 1000 gpm ensures a sufficient flow rate as assumed in the boron dilution and boron stratification evaluations. Having reactor coolant level below the vessel flange prior to making the safety injection pumps operable provides sufficient empty volume in the reactor coolant system, to where cold over-pressure concerns are negligible.

The change that adds the restriction to the Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 footnote will ensure that the operating pump will not be intentionally deenergized during operation with the RCS loops partially filled.

Based on the previous discussion, the licensee concluded that the proposed amendment request does not involve a significant increase in the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; nor involve a significant reduction in the required margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards considerations determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. The staff has, therefore, made a proposed determination that the licensee's request does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room
Location: Emporia State University,
William Allen White Library, 1200
Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas
66801 and Washburn University School
of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621
Attorney for Licensee: Jay Silberg,
Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and

Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20037

NRC Project Director: Frederick J.
Hebden

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated. No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendments, (2) the amendments, and (3) the Commission's related letters, Safety Evaluations and/or Environmental Assessments as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms for the particular facilities involved. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects.

Arkansas Power & Light Company,
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368, Arkansas
Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Pope
County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: July 1,
1988 as supplemented by letter dated
August 15, 1989.

Brief description of amendment: The
amendment revised Facility Operating
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 for
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 to
authorize Entergy Operations,
Incorporated (EOI) to act on behalf of
Arkansas Power and Light (AP&L), with
responsibility for and control over the
physical construction, operation, and
maintenance of the facilities. This action
is in conjunction with EOI becoming the
operator of Waterford Steam Electric
Station, Unit 3 and of Grand Gulf Units 1
and 2.

Date of issuance: December 14, 1989

Effective date: December 14, 1989

Amendment Nos.: 128 and 102

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-
51 and NPF-6.* Amendment revised the
license.

*Date of initial notice in Federal
Register:* August 10, 1988 (53 FR 30126)
with the supplement on September 6,
1989 (54 FR 37041) and for antitrust
November 18, 1988 (53 FR 46725) with
the supplement on November 1, 1989 (54
FR 46168). The Commission's related
evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated
December 14, 1989.

Antitrust comments have been
received and are addressed in the
Commission's related safety evaluation.

*No significant hazards consideration
comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room
location:* Tomlinson Library, Arkansas
Tech University, Russellville, Arkansas
72801

Commonwealth Edison Company,
Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle
County Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2,
LaSalle County, Illinois

Date of application for amendments:
August 18, 1989, as supplemented
September 13, 1989

Brief description of amendments: The
amendments revised the Technical
Specifications (TS) to replace the values
of the cycle-specific parameter limits
with a reference to the Core Operating
Limits Report, which contains the values
of the cycle-specific parameter limits.
The associated Bases of the TS were
also revised to reflect the changes and
Section 1.0 of the TS was modified to
include the definition of the Core
Operating Limits Report. Additionally,
the amendments administratively
renumbered and reorganized the

Definition Section and the Table of
Contents, and made editorial changes.

Date of issuance: December 18, 1989

Effective date: December 18, 1989

Amendment Nos.: 70 and 54

*Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-
11 and NPF-18.* Amendments revised the
Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal
Register:* October 4, 1989 (54 FR 40926).
The Commission's related evaluation of
the amendments is contained in a Safety
Evaluation dated December 18, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration
comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room
location:* Public Library of Illinois Valley
Community College, Rural Route No. 1,
Oglesby, Illinois 61348

**Consolidated Edison Company of New
York, Docket No. 50-247, Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2,
Westchester County, New York**

Date of application for amendment:
June 12, 1989, as clarified July 11, 1989.

Brief description of amendment: The
amendment (1) revises the allowable
out-of-service time in Technical
Specification (TS) 3.3.B.2.c for
inoperable containment spray system
valves from 24 hours to 72 hours, (2)
adds a new TS 3.3.B.2.d permitting
reactor operation to continue for up to
72 hours with the spray additive tank
and its associated piping, valves and
eductors inoperable provided certain
conditions are satisfied, and (3) adds a
new TS 3.7.B.5 permitting reactor
operation to continue for up to 24 hours
with one of the battery chargers
associated with station batteries 21, 22,
23 and 24 inoperable provided certain
conditions and actions are satisfied.

Date of issuance: December 7, 1989

Effective date: December 7, 1989

Amendment No.: 144

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-
26:* Amendment revised the Technical
Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal
Register:* September 20, 1989 (54 FR
38763). The Commission's related
evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated
December 7, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration
comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room
location:* White Plains Public Library,
100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New
York 10610.

**Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-
369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina**

Date of application for amendments:
August 3, 1989, as supplemented
November 9, 1989.

Brief description of amendments: The
amendments change the Technical
Specifications to reduce from 75% to 50%
the number of movable incore detector
thimbles in McGuire Unit 1 required to
be available during the remainder of the
present fuel cycle for the Movable
Incore Detector System to be declared
operable.

Date of issuance: December 14, 1989

Effective date: December 14, 1989

Amendment Nos.: 101, 83

*Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-9
and NPF-17:* Amendments revised the
Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal
Register:* August 21, 1989 (54 FR 34633).
The November 9, 1989, supplement did
not change the substance of the changes
nor the proposed determination of no
significant hazards consideration
contained in the initial notice. The
Commission's related evaluation of the
amendments is contained in a Safety
Evaluation dated December 14, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration
comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room
location:* Atkins Library, University of
North Carolina, Charlotte (UNCC
Station), North Carolina 28223

**Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-
269, 50-270 and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear
Station, Units 1, 2 and 3, Oconee County,
South Carolina**

Date of application for amendments:
September 25, 1989, as supplemented
October 18, 1989

Brief description of amendments:
These amendments revise the TSs to
account for minor changes in power
peaking and control rod worths resulting
from the Oconee Unit 3 core reload. In
addition, the use of the VIPRE thermal
hydraulic code is referenced and all
specifications associated with two
reactor coolant pump operations are
deleted.

Date of issuance: December 15, 1989

Effective date: December 15, 1989

Amendment Nos.: 180, 180, 177

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-
38, DPR-47 and DPR-55.* Amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal
Register:* November 1, 1989 (54 FR
46146). The Commission's related
evaluation of the amendments is

contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 15, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Oconee County Library, 501 West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691

GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey

Date of application for amendment: October 11, 1989, supplemented October 26, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment replaces the organizational charts in the Technical Specifications with more general organizational requirements. These general requirements capture the essence of those organizational features depicted on the charts necessary for ensuring that the plant can be operated safely.

Date of Issuance: December 21, 1989

Effective date: December 21, 1989

Amendment No.: 134

Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 15, 1989 (54 FR 47604). The Commission's related evaluation of this amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 21, 1989

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Ocean County Library, Reference Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms River, New Jersey 08753.

Louisiana Power and Light Company, Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana

Date of amendment request: July 1, 1988 as supplemented by letter dated August 15, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for Waterford 3 to authorize Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) to act on behalf of Louisiana Power and Light (LP&L), with responsibility for and control over the physical construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility. This action is in conjunction with EOI becoming the operator of Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 and Grand Gulf, Units 1 and 2.

Date of issuance: December 14, 1989

Effective date: December 14, 1989

Amendment No.: 60

Facility Operating License No. NPF-38. Amendment revised the License Conditions.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 10, 1988 (53 FR 30136) with the supplement on September 6, 1989 (54 FR 37047) and for Antitrust, November 18, 1988 (53 FR 46725) with a supplement on November 1, 1989 (54 FR 46168). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 14, 1989.

Antitrust comments have been received and are addressed in the Commission's related safety evaluation.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: University of New Orleans Library, Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, Louisiana 70122.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-220, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendments: May 1, 1989, as amended June 15, 1989

Brief description of amendments: This amendment revises Technical Specification (Appendix A) Section 3.1.8 and its associated Bases to permit that one Feedwater Pump blocking valve in one HPCI pump train may be closed during reactor startup when core power is equal to or less than 25% of rated thermal power.

Date of issuance: December 14, 1989

Effective date: December 14, 1989

Amendment Nos.: 113

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-63: Amendments revise the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 9, 1989 (54 FR 32712). The Commission's related evaluation of these amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 14, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, New London County, Connecticut

Date of application for amendment: October 6, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The change to the Technical Specifications reduces the reporting requirements in Section 3.6.C.1.a for iodine spiking from a short-term report to inclusion in the Annual Report (Section 6.9.1.5) and eliminates the requirement to shutdown the plant if primary coolant activity

limits are exceeded for 800 hours in a 12-month period.

Date of issuance: December 21, 1989

Effective date: December 21, 1989

Amendment No.: 42

Facility Operating License No. DPR-21. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 1, 1989 (54 FR 4651). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 21, 1989

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Waterford Public Library, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut 06385.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Docket No. 50-352, Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendment: July 11, 1989 and supplemented by letter dated November 3, 1989. The supplemental letter does not change the intent of the original request.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-06 "Removal of Organization Charts from Technical Specification Administrative Control Requirements" to: (1) remove the onsite and offsite organizational charts from TS Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, respectively and (2) make certain miscellaneous administrative changes in Section 6 of the TSs (Administrative Control) related to revisions to the corporate organization.

Date of issuance: December 19, 1989

Effective date: December 19, 1989

Amendment No.: 35

Facility Operating License No. NPF-39. This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 23, 1989 (54 FR 35106). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 19, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Pottstown Public Library, 500 High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464.

Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendment: May 31, 1989, amended July 18, 1989, amplified November 20, 1989.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment modifies the Residual Heat Removal surveillance criteria to reflect deletion of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection System loop selection logic scheme. It also clarifies the use of the terms "demonstrate" and "verify" throughout the Technical Specifications.

Date of issuance: December 26, 1989

Effective date: December 26, 1989

Amendment No.: 148

Facility Operating License No. DPR-59: Amendment revised the Technical Specification.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31116). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 26, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Penfield Library, State University College of Oswego, Oswego, New York.

Public Service Company of Colorado, Docket No. 50-267, Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Platteville, Colorado

Date of amendment request: September 14, 1989 as revised December 4, 1989

Brief description of amendment: Changes to Technical Specification requirements for fuel handling and storage.

Date of issuance: December 14, 1989

Effective date: December 14, 1989

Amendment No.: 75

Facility Operating License No. DPR-34: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications/license.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 18, 1989 (54 FR 42861). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 14, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Greeley Public Library, City Complex Building, Greeley, Colorado

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of application for amendment: September 25, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment request revised the Technical Specifications by deleting references to conditions permitted during the startup testing program.

Date of issuance: December 18, 1989

Effective date: As of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of its date of issuance.

Amendment No. 35

Facility Operating License No. NPF-57: This amendment revised the Technical Specifications and/or License.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 1, 1989 (54 FR 46156). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 18, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Pennsville Public Library, 190 S. Broadway, Pennsville, New Jersey 08070

Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of application for amendment: June 12, 1989, supplemented August 11, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment extended the inspection interval for certain surveillance requirements for the emergency diesel generators in the Davis-Besse Technical Specifications from at least once per 18 months during shutdown to a maximum inspection interval not to exceed 30 months.

Date of issuance: December 22, 1989

Effective date: December 22, 1989

Amendment No. 141

Facility Operating License No. NPF-3: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 20, 1989 (54 FR 38766). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 22, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of application for amendment: October 9, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment changed the title of the Assistant Plant Manager-Operations in Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.2, Facility Staff, to Manager-Plant Operations. The amendment further changed TS 6.2.2 by allowing a previously held Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license for the Davis-Besse

Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) or for another pressurized water reactor to serve as acceptable qualifications for the Manager-Plant Operations. TS 6.3 was also revised to reflect this change.

Date of issuance: December 27, 1989

Effective date: December 27, 1989

Amendment No. 142

Facility Operating License No. NPF-3: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 15, 1989 (54 FR 47610). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 27, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin

Date of application for amendment: July 14, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment changed the Technical Specifications by revising the surveillance test frequency of the turbine stop valves, control valves, and interceptor valves associated with turbine overspeed protection.

Date of issuance: December 22, 1989

Effective date: December 22, 1989

Amendment No. 84

Facility Operating License No. NPF-30: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 20, 1989 (54 FR 38769). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 22, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: University of Wisconsin Library Learning Center, 2420 Nicolet Drive, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54301.

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND FINAL DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING (EXIGENT OR EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES)

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following

amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Because of exigent or emergency circumstances associated with the date the amendment was needed, there was not time for the Commission to publish, for public comment before issuance, its usual 30-day Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for a Hearing. For exigent circumstances, the Commission has either issued a Federal Register notice providing opportunity for public comment or has used local media to provide notice to the public in the area surrounding a licensee's facility of the licensee's application and of the Commission's proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. The Commission has provided a reasonable opportunity for the public to comment, using its best efforts to make available to the public means of communication for the public to respond quickly, and in the case of telephone comments, the comments have been recorded or transcribed as appropriate and the licensee has been informed of the public comments.

In circumstances where failure to act in a timely way would have resulted, for example, in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, the Commission may not have had an opportunity to provide for public comment on its no significant hazards determination. In such case, the license amendment has been issued without opportunity for comment. If there has been some time for public comment but less than 30 days, the Commission may provide an opportunity for public comment. If comments have been requested, it is so stated. In either event, the State has been consulted by telephone whenever possible.

Under its regulations, the Commission may issue and make an amendment immediately effective, notwithstanding the pendency before it of a request for a hearing from any person, in advance of the holding and completion of any required hearing, where it has

determined that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

The Commission has applied the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is contained in the documents related to this action. Accordingly, the amendments have been issued and made effective as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment, (2) the amendment to Facility Operating License, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects.

The Commission is also offering an opportunity for a hearing with respect to the issuance of the amendments. By February 9, 1990, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the Local Public Document Room for the particular facility involved.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendments under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

Since the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in effect.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 325-6000 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

Arizona Public Service Company, et al.,
Docket No. STN 50-529, Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2,
Maricopa County, Arizona

Date of application for amendment:
October 13, 1989 as revised December
20, 1989.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment authorizes a one-time extension of the 18-month surveillance interval for (1) the Class 1E Diesel Generator and Integrated Safeguards Test, and (2) the Station Battery Surveillance Test beyond the 25 percent allowable interval increase by approximately two additional months, until the second refueling outage for Unit 2.

Date of issuance: December 22, 1989

Effective date: December 22, 1989

Amendment No.: 30

Facility Operating License No. NPF-51: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 13, 1989 (54 FR 51253). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of exigent circumstances, consultation with the State of Arizona, and final determination of no significant hazards consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 22, 1989.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Phoenix Public Library, Business and Science Division, 12 East McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona 85004.

Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendment:
December 11, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment changes the trip level setpoint for the High Pressure Coolant Injection System steam line high flow isolation and related Bases.

Date of issuance: December 15, 1989

Effective date: December 15, 1989

Amendment No.: 147

Facility Operating License No. DPR-59: Amendment revised the Technical Specification.

Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration: No. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of emergency circumstances, and final determination of no significant hazards consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 15, 1989.

Attorney for Licensee: Mr. Charles M. Pratt, 1633 Broadway, New York, New York 10019.

Local Public Document Room location: Penfield Library, State University College of Oswego, Oswego, New York.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of January, 1990.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects-I/II,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
[FR Doc. 90-462 Filed 1-9-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-D

[Docket No. 50-219]

GPU Nuclear Corp. and Jersey Central Power & Light Co.; Issuance of Amendment to Provisional Operating License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued Amendment No. 135 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 issued to GPU Nuclear Corporation (the licensee), which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station located in Ocean County, New Jersey. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to delete Technical Specification Safety Limit 2.1.E which required at least two recirculation loops to be fully open except when the reactor vessel head is off and vessel water level is above the main steam nozzle. The amendment also incorporates this limitation in Technical Specification 3.3.F and that limitation is revised to require that at least one recirculation loop, instead of two be fully open during applicable plant conditions. The proposed change would also require that during power operations if at least four recirculation loops cannot be maintained in service, then hot shutdown or refuel conditions must be reached in 12 hours. Presently, the requirement is that the unit be placed in cold shutdown conditions within 24 hours.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Committee has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the