

a. Persons in Vietnam and Laos with past or present ties to the United States; persons who have been or currently are in reeducation camps in Vietnam or seminar camps in Laos; Amerasians in Vietnam; and the accompanying family members of such persons.

b. Present and former political prisoners and persons in imminent danger of loss of life in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and their accompanying family members.

You are hereby authorized and directed to report this Determination to the Congress immediately and to publish it in the Federal Register.

Ronald Reagan

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 5, 1987.

[FR Doc. 87-25520

Filed 10-30-87; 12:54 pm]

Billing code 3195-01-M

Rules and Regulations

Federal Register

Vol. 52, No. 212

Tuesday, November 3, 1987

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510. The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each week.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Commodity Credit Corporation

7 CFR Parts 1468 and 1472

Payment Program for Mohair and Shorn Wool and Unshorn Lambs (Pulled Wool), 1986 Through 1990

AGENCY: Commodity Credit Corporation, USDA.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this rule is to adopt, as a final rule, an interim rule which was published in the Federal Register on February 11, 1987 (52 FR 4275) and to make this final rule retroactively effective to August 23, 1985 (wool) and November 14, 1985 (mohair). The interim rule amended the mohair and wool price support regulations with respect to a producer's eligibility for price support payments for mohair and wool, respectively, and made certain other minor changes.

EFFECTIVE DATES: August 23, 1985 for the wool price support regulations (7 CFR Part 1472); November 14, 1985 for mohair price support regulations (7 CFR Part 1468).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Harry D. Millner, Agriculture Program Specialist, Emergency Operations and Livestock Programs Division, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, United States Department of Agriculture, P.O. Box 2415, Washington, DC 20013. Telephone (202) 475-3605.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This final rule has been reviewed under U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) procedures established in accordance with provisions of Executive Order 12291 and Departmental Regulation No. 1512-1 and has been classified as "not major." It has been determined that these provisions will not result in: (1) An annual effect on the economy of \$100 million or more; (2) major increases in

costs of prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographical regions; or (3) significant adverse effects on competition, employment investment, productivity, innovation or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets.

The title and number of the Federal assistance programs to which this rule applies are: Title—Commodity loans and Purchases; Number—10.051, as found in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.

It has been determined that the Regulatory Flexibility Act is not applicable to this final rule since CCC is not required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other provision of law to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking with respect to the subject matter of this rule.

It has been determined by an environmental evaluation that this action will have no significant impact on the quality of the human environment. Therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an Environmental Impact Statement is needed.

These programs/activities are not subject to the provisions of Executive Order 12372 which requires intergovernmental consultation with State and local officials. See the Notice related to 7 CFR Part 3015, Subpart V, published at 48 FR 29115 (June 24, 1983).

Background

On February 11, 1987, the Commodity Credit Corporation, U.S. Department of Agriculture (CCC/USDA) published an interim rule in the Federal Register (52 FR 4275) which amended the mohair and wool price support regulations with respect to producers eligibility for price support payments on sales of mohair and wool.

There were two principle changes. First, the interim rule deleted the requirement that in order to be eligible for price support payment, a sale must be made to a person or business engaged in the business of buying and selling mohair or wool on a grease basis. In its stead, the regulations were amended to require only that the wool or mohair must be sold to a person or business which normally purchases wool or mohair on a grease basis. Second, the interim rule established a procedure whereby a limit is placed on the amount of the sales price of the wool

or mohair received by a producer on which the price support payment would be made.

The changes in the interim rule were necessary to correct certain unintended effects resulting from the changes to the mohair and wool price support regulations made on November 14, 1985 (50 FR 47033) and August 23, 1985 (50 FR 34082) (hereafter the "1985 amendments"), respectively. The 1985 amendments were made to correct certain abuses by producers which were discovered during a review of the 1983 wool price support program conducted by CCC/USDA.

The review disclosed that, in many instances, price support payments were made to producers who sold wool to persons not engaged in the business of buying and selling wool, such as a family member, or to a business in which the producer had an interest. These fictitious or fraudulent transactions often resulted in reports of sales of wool which were not bona fide sales and which were often at substantially higher prices than the prices generally received by producers who marketed their wool through normal or traditional channels. Thus, because of these higher prices these producers received higher price support payments. The review also revealed attempts to submit to CCC/USDA documents representing sales, transfers, or other arrangements with respect to wool which were fictitious or not legally binding.

Accordingly, the mohair and wool price support regulations were amended in 1985 to address these concerns. The 1985 amendments set forth the requirements of a bona fide marketing of wool and mohair which would be eligible for a price support payment. Among the requirements were that the mohair and wool had to be sold to a person or business engaged in the business of buying and selling wool and mohair on a grease basis and that the mohair or wool had to be purchased in the course of that business. The sale also had to be based on the fair market value for mohair and a reasonable appraised price for wool.

However, in early 1986, it was determined by CCC/USDA, after thorough consideration of the impact of the 1985 amendments on certain mohair and wool producers, that the 1985 amendments had the unintended effect

of disqualifying producers who sold mohair and wool to purchasers, such as hobby crafters, handspinners and other similar individuals who were only buying mohair or wool for their handspinning and crafting activities. Accordingly, CCC/USDA determined that price support payments should be made available on sales made by producers to hobby crafters, handspinners and similar individuals who only purchased wool or mohair but did not sell wool or mohair. However, since these sales were made at prices substantially higher than prices generally received by producers who marketed their mohair and wool through normal or traditional channels, it was determined that the price support payments should not be made on the entire sales price per pound but only on the appraised price of wool or mohair which, for the 1985 marketing year, was determined to be that portion of the sales price per pound which was four times the national average market price for wool or mohair received by all producers for that year. Accordingly, on May 21, 1986, CCC/USDA, through the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), issued a directive (Notice LD-276) to all ASCS State and county offices advising them to make price support payments in accordance with such determinations and, in cases where price support payments had been made prior to the issuance of the notice, to review the producer's files and to recover any portion of the price support payments not made in accordance with the notice.

Many producers have written to the CCC/USDA concerning the action taken by CCC/USDA pursuant to Notice LD-276. CCC/USDA has made clear in all its responses that under the wool and mohair price support regulations in existence at the time price support payments were due for the 1985 marketings of wool and mohair, producers who made sales to hobby crafters, handspinners, and other similar individuals were not eligible for any price support payments on such sales because such sales were not made to purchasers who were in the business of buying and selling wool and mohair. The producers were advised that the action taken by the CCC/USDA in Notice LD-276 provided a reasonable, fair and equitable treatment of those producers who were otherwise not eligible for price support payments.

The interim rule, therefore, was issued to amend mohair and wool price support regulations to reflect the determinations made by CCC/USDA with respect to the eligibility of sales made by producers to

purchasers such as hobby crafters and handspinners.

On April 1, 1987, the Comptroller General of the United States, after reviewing the action taken by the CCC/USDA in the issuance of Notice LD-276 and the subsequent promulgation of the interim rule on February 11, 1987, issued an opinion which stated that the action taken by the CCC/USDA through the notice in authorizing price support payments to producers who were not eligible under the mohair and wool price support regulations was not consistent with the regulations. The Comptroller General, however, stated that the interim regulations were legally sound and that the CCC/USDA had the authority to limit price support payments based on the sales price of mohair and wool.

The interim rule amends the mohair and wool price support regulations at 7 CFR 1468.107(c) and 1472.1507(c), respectively, to delete the requirements that to constitute a bona fide marketing of mohair or wool, (i) the person or business buying mohair or wool must be engaged in the business of buying and selling grease basis mohair or wool and buys the mohair or wool in the course of the business and (ii) the sale must be based on the fair market value for mohair and a reasonably appraised price for wool.

The interim rule also amended 7 CFR 1468.116 and 1472.1545 of the mohair and wool price support regulations, respectively, to provide that price support payments shall not be made with respect to that portion of the sales proceeds received by a producer for eligible mohair or wool which is based on sales prices in excess of the maximum sales price per pound as determined by the Deputy Administrator State and County Operations (DASCO). ASCS, DASCO will determine such maximum sales price per pound for mohair and wool marketed in each marketing year on the basis of the national average market price of mohair or wool computed for each marketing year. Such maximum sales price shall be an amount which DASCO determines will encourage the continued domestic production of mohair and wool at prices fair to both producers and consumers in a manner which would assure a viable domestic mohair and wool industry. Such maximum sales price shall be publicly announced by USDA at the end of each marketing year for mohair or wool.

Discussion of Comments

A total of 106 comments were received concerning the interim rule. Of these, 72 came from producers, 20 from

producers/spinners, 12 from wool grower groups/associations, 1 from a State Department of Agriculture, and 1 from a Congressman.

The comments focused generally on the area of limiting the amount of price support payments based on a maximum sales price per pound as determined by DASCO. There was little comment on the part of the rule which deleted the requirement that sales of mohair or wool had to be made to a purchaser who was in the business of buying and selling mohair or wool and which provided in lieu thereof the requirement that the mohair or wool had to be sold to a person or business which normally purchased mohair or wool on a grease basis.

A. Favorable Comments

Six commentors supported the portion of the interim rule which limited the amount of price support payment based on the sales price of the mohair or wool. These commentors stated that producers who sold wool or mohair to hobby crafters and handspinners should not be entitled to receive price support payments on the full sales price of the mohair or wool because they were selling wool in a specialized market that permitted them to receive prices far in excess of the prices that a majority of producers received by selling their mohair and wool in the usual or normal market trade channels. A seventh commentor was in favor of §§ 1472.1503 and 1472.1507 of the interim rule but objected to § 1472.1545 without giving any reason.

B. Objections

Most commentors opposed the portion of the interim rule which limited the amount of the price support payments based on the sales price of the mohair or wool. Forty six individuals and three associations objected to the interim rule without giving any reason for their objection.

These commentors stated that there should not be a limit on the amount of the sales price on which price support payments would be made because of the marketing techniques of producers and that the price support payments should be made on the full sales price of the mohair or wool which really was a free market price. They claimed that the mohair or wool they sold commanded premium prices because of the high quality wool they produced through special care and efforts, good management, and selective breeding. They believed that they are being penalized for producing a superior wool comparable to high quality wool from

New Zealand and that the CCC/USDA had changed the mohair and wool price support programs after the producers had made significant investments in the production of high quality wool. They also claim that while there may have been some cases of fraud, most of their sales were made to bona fide purchasers and, therefore, they were entitled to price support payments based on the full sales price. They claim that the mohair and wool price support programs had been established to encourage people to stay in the sheep producing business and that any limitation of price support payments was inconsistent with this objective. They further claimed that since the price support funds came from tariffs on imports and not from money collected from taxpayers, there was no cost to the government and, therefore, there should be no limit to the price support payments. They claim that price support payments are an incentive to (1) produce more mohair and wool, (2) produce a better quality wool and mohair, and (3) receive as high a price for mohair and wool as possible, and that, the higher the price of the mohair and wool, the closer the average mohair and wool price will be to the support price and the lower the price support payment and the lower overall cost to the Government.

The CCC/USDA has reviewed all these comments and has determined that they do not provide an adequate basis to change the interim rule for reasons discussed hereafter.

a. *Small Producers:* The producers who are primarily affected by the interim rule are those that sell their mohair and wool production to hobby crafters, handspinners, and other similar individuals. They constitute a relatively small number of all the mohair and wool producers in the United States. However, the CCC/USDA does recognize that these small mohair and wool producers are an important segment of the mohair and wool industry. CCC/USDA commends these small producers who are producing a superior premium mohair or wool comparable to the high quality wool from New Zealand through special care and effort and marketing techniques. The rule, of course, is intended to apply not only to small producers of mohair or wool but to all producers regardless of whether they market mohair or wool to handspinners and hobby crafters or to the industry as a whole.

b. *Abuses in the Wool Price Support Program:* It appears that some commentators misunderstood the discussion in the preamble to the interim rule concerning the producer abuses

discovered in the review of the 1983 wool price support program. There was no intent to correlate the relatively high sales prices of mohair or wool through nontraditional channels with fictitious or otherwise improper sales. The review uncovered many types of abuses which led to the 1985 amendments to prevent such abuses. As previously explained in the preamble, the 1985 amendments had unintended effects in that they disqualified all sales of mohair and wool made by producers to hobby crafters, handspinners, and other similar individuals. Accordingly, the interim rule corrects the unintended effects of the 1985 amendments by permitting price support payments on sales made by producers to persons who normally purchase wool such as hobby crafters, etc.

c. *Limit on Price Support Payments:*

As indicated previously, CCC/USDA is aware that the relatively high prices received by these producers were not due to fictitious sales but due to the high quality mohair or wool produced by them. CCC/USDA also understands that these sales which are made through nontraditional channels reflect changes in the mohair and wool industry and that the sales made by these producers at substantially higher prices are due to supply/demand pressures for high quality mohair and wool. CCC/USDA also is aware of the special efforts in management, stock breeding, and marketing techniques used by these producers to develop high quality mohair and wool. All these efforts to develop high quality mohair and wool and to sell them at a premium price is to be commended. However, CCC/USDA is limiting the amount of price support payments based on the sales price of mohair and wool because it is in accord with the purpose of the National Wool Act of 1954 (Wool Act), and because it utilizes the U.S. taxpayers money for the mohair and wool price support programs in the most effective way.

The legislative history of the Wool Act indicates that the main purpose of the Wool Act is to enable the producers to compete successfully with producers from cheaper production areas of the world and to encourage the rebuilding of sheep herds so that the United States produces a larger proportion of its own mohair and wool requirements.

CCC/USDA believes that price support payments authorized under the Wool Act are intended to encourage the domestic production of mohair and wool at prices fair to both producers and consumers in a manner which assures a viable domestic mohair and wool industry.

Section 704 of the Wool Act provides, in part, that "[i]f payments are utilized as the means of price support, the payments shall be such as the Secretary of Agriculture determines to be sufficient, when added to the national average price received by producers, to give producers a national average return for the commodity equal to the support level." In 1985, the wool price support level was \$1.65 per pound and the national average market price for wool was 63.3 cents per pound. The price support payment rate based on the difference between these two figures was 165 per centum. This percentage was applied to the sales proceeds of all 1985 marketings except, pursuant to Notice LD-276, it was not applied to the portion of any sales proceeds to the extent that the sales price per pound exceeded four times the national average market price.

The premium price received by producers on their sale to hobby crafters, handspinners, etc. were substantially higher than the 1985 wool price support level of \$1.65 per pound and far in excess of the national average market price of 63.3 cents per pound. In addition, these producers received price support payments on that portion of the sales proceeds which did not exceed four times the national average market price for wool or \$2.53 per pound (4 times 63.3).

Under these circumstances it would appear to be difficult for these producers to claim that they were unfairly treated or that such limitation was not in accordance with the purpose of the Wool Act or that it was not a reasonable limitation of the expenditures of taxpayers money.

d. *Tariff Act of 1930, as amended:*

There is a general misunderstanding that price support payments made under the Wool Act are financed by duties on wool and not from the U.S. Treasury because sections 704 and 705 of the Wool Act refer to duties collected under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. However, the reference to such duties in sections 704 and 705 merely places a limit on the total amount of price support payments which can be made to 70 percent of the duties collected. These duties are collected and deposited in the U.S. Treasury and used for general governmental purposes. Price support payments for mohair and wool are paid from Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds and section 705 of the Wool Act provides for reimbursement to CCC from the U.S. Treasury not to exceed 70 per centum of the gross receipts from duties collected.

e. Maximum Sales Price Per Pound:

There were a number of comments with respect to the changes in the mohair and wool price support regulations to limit the amount of price support payments based on the sales price per pound for mohair and wool. A number of commentors objected to the deletion of the provision in § 1472.1507 which provided that a bona fide marketing was a "sale based on a reasonably appraised price for wool." Their comments suggest that the price support payments for their speciality wool be based on the full free market value of such speciality wool or the appraised price of such wool in the speciality market for such wool.

The phrase "reasonable appraised price of wool" in § 1472.1507 and a comparable phrase "fair market value for mohair" in § 1468.107(c) were deleted because they were inconsistent provisions and also because they were intended to prevent price support payments to be made where the sales price of the mohair or wool was substantially higher than the reasonable appraised price of wool or the fair market value for mohair in the traditional wool or mohair markets, respectively. In such case the entire sales price would have been ineligible for price support payments. However, these provisions were deleted because CCC/USDA did not wish to make the entire sales proceeds of wool and mohair sold to hobby crafters, hand-spinners, and similar individuals ineligible for price support payments.

Another comment urged that since the premium prices received by the producers on sales of high quality wool to hobby crafters and handspinners have been used to calculate the national average price for wool, the same premium price should be used to calculate the wool price support payment. The premium prices for high quality wool are included in the determination of the national average market price which is determined by taking the average weighted market price of all wool sold by producers. Section 704 of the Wool Act provides that the price support payments shall be such as the Secretary of Agriculture determines to be sufficient when added to the national average price to equal the price support level for wool. This amount expressed in percentage is applied against the producer sales price to determine the price support payment due the producer. This percentage is applicable to all sales of wool. However, the interim rule would apply the percentage to each sales price up to the maximum sales price determined by DASCO for each marketing year.

There were also comments to the effect that sales by hobby crafters and handspinners should be considered sales through "normal channels" for high quality wool. We believe this is a matter of semantics. While the point of the comment is true, since only a small fraction of all the wool marketed is sold to hobby crafters and handspinners, the term "normal channels" was intended to mean the traditional sales of wool made to large commercial wool buyers.

There were also comments criticizing the limitation of the amount of the sales proceeds which would be eligible for price support payments to four times the national average price ("four times rule") as being unfair. The four times rule was effective for the 1985 and 1986 marketings of mohair and wool. Under the interim rule, the maximum sales price for which price support payments would be made is determined by DASCO at the end of each marketing year based on the national average market price and is an amount which DASCO determines will encourage the continued domestic production of wool at prices fair to both producers and consumers in a manner which would assure a viable domestic mohair and wool industry.

As indicated earlier, the Comptroller General of the United States reviewed the interim rule and concluded that CCC/USDA had authority to limit the amount of the sales price per pound on which price support payments would be made. The Comptroller General stated that since under the Wool Act the Secretary can set the amounts, terms, and conditions of price support operations, he had the authority to establish price support payment limitations to prevent abuses, based on the reasonably appraised prices for wool.

The final rule provides that the effective date will be retroactive to the dates the 1985 amendments were made to the mohair and wool price support regulations; November 14, 1985 and August 23, 1985, respectively. It is necessary that the interim rule be made effective retroactively in order to nullify the unintended effects of the 1985 amendments with respect to the eligibility of certain producers to receive price support payments who would otherwise not be eligible for price support payments. The retroactive application will not affect other producers who were otherwise eligible for price support payments.

List of Subjects**7 CFR Part 1468**

Commodity Credit Corporation, Price Support Program—Mohair, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

7 CFR Part 1472

Commodity Credit Corporation, Price Support Program—Wool, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Final Rule

Accordingly, the interim rule published at 52 FR 4275 (February 11, 1987), which amended 7 CFR Parts 1468 and 1472, is hereby adopted as a final rule without change.

Authority: Secs. 4 and 5, 62 Stat. 1070, as amended (15 U.S.C. 714b, 714c); secs. 702-708, 68 Stat. 910-912, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1781-1787).

Signed at Washington, DC, on October 27, 1987.

Vern Neppi,

Acting Executive Vice President, Commodity Credit Corporation.

[FR Doc. 87-25382 Filed 11-2-87; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-05-M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**10 CFR Part 50**

Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline To Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its rules to provide criteria for the evaluation at the operating license review stage of utility-prepared emergency plans in situations in which state and/or local governments decline to participate further in emergency planning. The rule is consistent with the approach adopted by Congress in section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-295, described in the Conference Report on that statute (H.96-1070, June 4, 1980), twice re-enacted by the Congress (in Pub. L. 97-415, Jan. 4, 1983, and Pub. L. 98-553, Oct. 30, 1984), and followed in a prior adjudicatory decision of the Commission, *Long Island Lighting Co.*, (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 (1986). The rule

recognizes that though state and local participation in emergency planning is highly desirable, and indeed is essential for maximum effectiveness of emergency planning and preparedness, Congress did not intend that the absence of such participation should preclude licensing of substantially completed nuclear power plants where there is a utility-prepared emergency plan that provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection to the public.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 3, 1987.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peter G. Crane, Office of the General Counsel, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555, 202-634-1465

Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555, 301-443-7657.

David B. Matthews, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555, 301-492-9647.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

On March 6, 1987, the NRC published its notice of proposed rulemaking in the *Federal Register*, at 52 FR 6980. The period for public comment (60 days, subsequently extended for an additional 30 days) expired on June 4, 1987.

The proposed rule drew an unprecedentedly large number of comments. Some 11,500, individual letters were sent to NRC, as well as 27,000 individually signed form letters sent to Congress or the White House and forwarded to NRC. Approximately 16,300 persons signed petitions to the NRC. Every comment was read, including form letters, which were examined one by one so that any individual messages added by the signatories could be taken into account. NRC attempted to send cards of acknowledgment to each commenter.

The sheer volume of the comments received makes it clearly impracticable to discuss them individually. As a result, the following discussion will focus on the principal issues raised in the comments.

Issue #1. Is the proposed rule legal? Specifically, is it in accord with the language and legislative history of the emergency planning provisions enacted by the Congress in 1980?

Answer: Yes. The intent of the proposed rule, as clarified in Commission testimony and in other responses to the Congress, is to give effect to the Congress's 1980 compromise approach to emergency planning; not go beyond it. To explain this requires a somewhat detailed discussion of the background of the actions taken in 1980 by Congress and

by the Commission with regard to emergency planning.

The backdrop for the actions taken by the Congress and the Commission in 1980 was, of course, the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island. The accident changed the NRC's regulatory approach to radiological emergency planning. Before the accident, emergency planning received relatively little attention from nuclear regulators. The prevailing assumption was that engineered safety features in nuclear power plants, coupled with sound operation and management, made it unlikely that emergency planning would ever be needed. At that time, only a limited evaluation of offsite emergency planning issues took place in the pre-construction review of applications to build nuclear power plants. The Three Mile Island accident led to the widespread recognition that, while there is no substitute for a well built, well run, and well regulated nuclear power plant, a substantial upgrading of the role of emergency planning was necessary if the public health and safety were to be adequately protected.

The Commission issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in July 1979, and in September and December of the same year it issued proposed emergency planning rules. 44 FR 54308 (September 19, 1979); 44 FR 75167 (December 19, 1979). Before the Commission took final action on the rules, however, the Congress took action, writing emergency planning provisions into the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295. It is extremely important to focus on what the Congress did in that Act, because Congress' actions were the starting point for all the NRC did subsequently in the emergency planning area, as the written record makes clear.

Section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act directed the Commission to establish regulations making the existence of an adequate emergency plan a prerequisite for issuance of an operating license to a nuclear facility. The NRC was further directed to promulgate standards for state radiological response plans.

In the same section of the 1980 Act, Congress specified the conditions under which the Commission could issue operating licenses, and in doing so, it made clear its preferences with regard to state and local participation. Its first preference, reflected in section 109(b)(1)(B)(i)(I), is for a "State or local radiological emergency response plan which provides for responding to any radiological emergency at the facility concerned and which complies with the Commission's standards for such plans."

In section 109(b)(1)(B)(i)(II), however, the Congress set out a second option: "In the absence of a plan which satisfies the requirements of subclause (I), there exists a State, local, or utility plan which provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned." (Emphasis added.) In addition, section 109 provided that the Commission's determination under the first but not the second of the two options could be made "only in consultation with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other appropriate agencies." Section 109(b)(1)(B)(ii). The statute further directed the Commission to "establish by rule . . . a mechanism to encourage and assist States to comply as expeditiously as practicable" with the NRC's standards for State radiological emergency response plans. Section 109(b)(1)(C).

The Conference Report on the legislation, H. 96-1070 (June 4, 1980) explained in clear terms, at p. 27, the rationale for the two-tiered approach: "The conferees sought to avoid penalizing an applicant for an operating license if a State or locality does not submit an emergency response plan to the NRC for review or if the submitted plan does not satisfy all the guidelines or rules. In the absence of a State or local plan that complies with the guidelines or rules, the compromise permits NRC to issue an operating license if it determines that a State, local or utility plan, such as the emergency preparedness plan submitted by the applicant, provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility." (Emphasis added.)

The statute, which was enacted on June 30, 1980, and the Conference Report make abundantly clear that in Congress' view, the ideal situation was one in which there is a state or local plan that meets all NRC standards. It is generally clear that in Congress' view, there could be emergency planning under a utility plan that to some degree fell short of the ideal but was nevertheless adequate to protect the health and safety of the public.

That Congressional judgment was before the Commission when it considered final emergency planning rules only a few weeks later, and the Commission took pains to make clear on the record that it was following the Congress' approach. As the Commission stated in its notice of final rulemaking, published on August 19, 1980, at 45 FR 55402:

Finally, on July 23, 1980, at the final Commission consideration of these rules, the Commission was briefed by the General Counsel on the substance of conversations with Congressional staff members who were involved with the passage of the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295. The General Counsel advised the Commission that the NRC final rules were consistent with that Act. The Commission has relied on all of the above information in its consideration of these final rules. In addition, the Commission directs that the transcripts of these meetings shall be part of the administrative record in this rulemaking.

In addition, in a key portion of the rule, dealing with the question of whether NRC should automatically shut down nuclear plants in the absence of an NRC-approved state or local emergency plan, or should instead evaluate all the relevant circumstances before deciding on remedial action, the NRC again explicitly followed the Congress' lead. In determining what action to take, the Commission said, it would look at the significance of deficiencies in emergency planning, the availability of compensating measures, and any compelling reasons arguing in favor of continued operation. 10 CFR 50.47(c). The Commission explained: "This interpretation is consistent with the provisions of the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L. 96-295." 45 FR 55403. Thus in deciding that the lack of an approved state or local plan should not be grounds for automatic shutdown of a nuclear power plant, the Commission expressly declared itself to be following the statutory approach.

This background sheds considerable light on a passage from the **Federal Register** notice which some commenters saw as indication that the Commission consciously decided in 1980 that states and localities should have the power to exercise a veto over nuclear power plant operation. The Commission said:

The Commission recognizes that there is a possibility that the operation of some reactors may be affected by this rule through inaction of State and local governments or an inability to comply with these rules. The Commission believes that the potential restriction of plant operation by State and local officials is not significantly different in kind and effect from the means already available to prohibit reactor operation. . . . Relative to applying this rule in actual practice, however, the Commission need not shut down a facility until all factors have been thoroughly examined.

45 FR 55404. (Emphasis added.)

It has been argued that the language just quoted indicates that the Commission made a conscious decision in 1980 to allow states and localities to exercise a veto power over completed nuclear power plants. Seen in context,

however, it is apparent that the Commission did no such thing. Rather, the Commission was acknowledging the fact that under the approach it was taking, the action (or inaction) of a state or locality had the potential to affect the operation of nuclear power plants, since state and local non-participation would clearly make it more difficult for an applicant to demonstrate the adequacy of emergency planning. It is worth emphasizing the word "potential" in the quoted passage. It indicates that the Commission believed that in some cases, state and local action or inaction might have the effect of restricting plant operation, while in other cases it would not. In other words, the Commission foresaw a case-by-case evaluation, with the result not foreordained either in the direction of plant operation or of shutdown. Clearly, neither the Commission nor the Congress envisioned that state or local non-participation should automatically bar plant operation without further inquiry.

The mechanism adopted by the Commission for implementing the two-tiered approach was set forth in 10 CFR 50.47 of the Commission's regulations. For the first tier, sixteen planning standards for a state or local emergency plan were spelled out in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1-16) of the Commission's regulations. The second tier, by contrast, was dealt with in a brief and unspecific provision, 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1):

Failure to meet the [16] applicable standards set forth in paragraph (b) of this section may result in the Commission declining to issue an operating license; however, the applicant will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operation.

In a 1986 decision, the Commission declared that in a situation in which state and local authorities decline to participate in emergency planning, the NRC has the authority and the legal obligation to consider a utility plan and render a judgment on the adequacy of emergency planning and preparedness. *Long Island Lighting Co.* (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22. The Commission observed in *LILCO* that the emergency planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)—the regulation which establishes the 16 planning standards by which a state and local plan is to be measured—"are premised on a high level of coordination between the utility and State and local governments," so that "[i]t should come as no surprise that without

governmental cooperation [the utility] has encountered great difficulty complying with all of these detailed planning standards." 22 NRC 22, 29. The Commission noted, however, that its emergency planning rules were intended to be "flexible," and that a utility plan will pass muster under 10 CFR 50.47(c) "notwithstanding noncompliance with the NRC's detailed planning standards * * * (1) if the defects are 'not significant'; (2) if there are 'adequate interim compensating actions'; or (3) if there are 'other compelling reasons.' " The Commission added: "The decisions below focus on (1) and (2) and we do likewise."

The Commission then explained that the "measure of significance under (1) and adequacy under (2) is the fundamental emergency planning standard of § 50.47(a) that 'no operating license * * * will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.' " The "root question," the Commission said, was whether a utility plan "can provide for 'adequate protective measures * * * in the event of a radiological emergency.' " To answer that question, the Commission continued, requires recognition of the fact that emergency planning requirements do not have fixed criteria, such as prescribed evacuation times or radiation dose savings, but rather aim at "reasonable and feasible dose reduction under the circumstances." 24 NRC 22, 30.

Thus the Commission is already on record as believing itself legally obligated to consider the adequacy of a utility plan in a situation of state and/or local non-participation in emergency planning. Likewise, it is on record as believing that the evaluation of a utility plan takes place in the context of the overriding obligation that no license can be issued unless the emergency plan is found to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protective measures in an emergency. The Commission believes that the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), which are used to evaluate a state or local plan, also provide an appropriate framework to evaluate a utility plan. Therefore, the new rule provides for the first time that where a utility plan is submitted, in a situation of state and/or local non-participation in emergency planning, it will be evaluated for adequacy against the same standards used to evaluate a state or local plan. However, due allowance will be made both for the non-participation of the state and/or local governmental authorities and for the compensatory

measures proposed by the utility in reaching a determination whether there is "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken."

To sum up, therefore, the rule is in accord with legal requirements for emergency planning at nuclear power plants because:

- The rule is consistent with section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980, a measure which has twice reenacted by the Congress, though it has since expired. In addition, the House of Representatives recently rejected an amendment designed to bar implementation of the rule for two specific plants.
- The rule is consistent with existing NRC regulations, and is well within NRC's rulemaking authority.
- Since the rule provides for no diminution of public protection from what was provided under existing regulations, it cannot be in contravention of any statutory requirements governing the level of NRC safety standards.

Issue #2: Is this a generic rule, or is this proposal really aimed at the Shoreham and Seabrook plants?

The rule is generic in the sense that it is of general applicability and future effect, covering future plants as well as existing plants. At present, however, there are only two plants with pending operating license applications for which state and/or local non-participation is an issue. Those plants are Shoreham and Seabrook. The NRC's 1980 rules, perhaps because of optimism that states and localities would always choose to be partners in emergency planning, included only a general provision, 10 CFR 50.47(c), dealing with cases in which utilities are unable to satisfy the standards for state and local emergency plans, and had no specific discussion of the evaluation of a utility plan in cases of state or local non-participation. This does not mean that the NRC was compelled to adopt new regulations in order to act on the Shoreham and Seabrook license applications. On the contrary, the NRC has always had the option of proceeding by case-by-case adjudication under its 1980 regulations.

Issue #3: Will this rule assure licenses to the Shoreham and Seabrook plants?

It will not assure a license to any particular plant or plants. It will establish a framework in which a utility seeking an operating license can, in a case of state and/or local non-participation, attempt to demonstrate to the NRC that emergency planning is adequate. Whether a utility could succeed in making that showing would

depend on the record developed in a specific adjudication, the results of which would be subject to multiple levels of review within the Commission as well as to review in the courts.

Issue #4: Is state or local participation essential for the NRC to determine that there will be adequate protection of the public health and safety?

We do not have a basis at this time for determining generically whether state and local participation in emergency planning is essential for NRC to determine that there will be adequate protection of the public health and safety. There has yet to be a final adjudicatory determination in any proceeding on the adequacy of a utility plan where state and local governmental authorities decline to participate in emergency planning. Clearly, it will be more difficult for a utility to satisfy the NRC of the adequacy of its plan in the absence of state and local participation, but whether it would be impossible remains to be seen. The fact that Congress provided for evaluation of a utility plan in section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 (and in two subsequent Authorization Acts) indicates that Congress believed that it was at least possible in some cases for a utility plan to be found to provide "reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned," in the words of the "second tier" provided in section 109.

Issue #5: Is emergency planning as important to safety as proper plant design and operation?

First of all, this issue does not have to be addressed in the context of the final rule announced in this notice, since the present rule involves no redrawing by NRC of the balance between emergency planning and other provisions for the protection of health and safety. Having said that, we turn to the question of the place of emergency planning in the overall regulatory scheme for the protection of public health and safety.

Though the Commission in its 1980 rulemaking explicitly described emergency planning as "essential," it is less clear what importance the Commission assigned to emergency planning, as compared to the importance accorded to other means of protecting public health and safety, notably sound siting, design, and operation. In the Supplementary Information explaining the 1980 rulemaking, the Commission stated that "adequate emergency preparedness is an essential aspect in the protection of the public health and safety," 55 FR 55404, and commented that "onsite and offsite emergency preparedness as well as proper siting

and engineered design features are needed to protect the health and safety of the public." (Emphasis added.) 45 FR 55403. The Commission also explained that in light of the Three Mile Island accident it had become "clear that the protection provided by siting and engineered design features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident." *Id.* Though the word "bolstered" suggests that the Commission of 1980 viewed emergency planning as a backstop for other means of public protection rather than as of equal importance to them, the issue cannot be resolved definitively by microscopic analysis of the particular words chosen in 1980.

More relevant to the task of ascertaining the intent of the 1980 rulemaking is the regulatory structure established under the 1980 rules. In 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii), the Commission provided that if it "finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency * * * and if the deficiencies * * * are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate." In other words, a plant ordinarily may operate for at least four months with deficiencies in emergency planning before the NRC is required even to decide whether remedial action should be taken. This approach, the Commission said in the Supplementary Information to the 1980 rule, was consistent with section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980, 45 FR 55407. At the time that the Commission created the so-called "120-day clock" for deficiencies in emergency planning, it was settled Commission law (and remains so today) that the NRC must issue an order directing a licensee to show cause why its license should not be modified, revoked or suspended whenever it concludes that "substantial health or safety issues have been raised" about the activities authorized by the license. *Consolidated Edison Company of New York* (Indian Point, Units No. 1, 2 and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 176. That standard was endorsed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in *Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. NRC*, 606 F.2d 1363 (1978). In the context of that standard, the 120-day clock provision for emergency planning deficiencies amounts to a Commission

finding that, at least for the first 120 days, even a major deficiency in emergency planning does not automatically raise a "substantial health or safety issue" with regard to plant operation. By contrast, a major safety deficiency relating to emergency conditions—for example, the availability of the emergency core cooling system—would warrant immediate shutdown.

In sum, despite language indicating that emergency planning was "essential," the Commission in 1980 created a regulatory structure in which emergency planning was treated somewhat differently, in terms of the corrective actions to be taken when deficiencies are identified, from the engineered safety features ("hardware") that would be relied on in an emergency.

Issue #6: Assuming that NRC should consider a utility plan, what criteria should apply? In particular:

(a) Should the utility plan provide just as much protection as a state or local plan, or may less protection be adequate?

(b) If less protection may be adequate, must NRC still find reasonable assurance that under the utility plan, adequate protective measures can and will be taken? Or is it sufficient for NRC to find that the totality of the risk, including all relevant factors, including the likelihood of an accident, assures that there is adequate protection of public health and safety?

Under the rule adopted in this notice, a utility plan, to pass muster, is required to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency. The rule recognizes—as did Congress when it enacted and re-enacted the provisions of Section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980—that no utility plan is likely to be able to provide the same degree of public protection that would obtain under ideal conditions, i.e. a state or local plan with full state and local participation, but that it *may* nevertheless be adequate. The rule starts from the premise that accidents can happen, and that at every plant, adequate emergency planning measures are needed to protect the public in the event an accident occurs. Whether in fact a particular utility plan will be found adequate would be a matter for adjudication in individual licensing proceedings.

Issue #7: May NRC assume that a state or local government which refuses to cooperate in emergency planning will still respond to the best of its ability in an actual emergency? If so:

(a) May NRC assume that the state or local response will be in accord with the utility plan?

(b) May NRC assume that the state or local response will be adequate?

(c) If the NRC rule calls for reliance on FEMA, and FEMA says that it can't judge emergency planning except when there is state and local participation in an exercise, how can the NRC ever make a judgment on emergency planning in a situation in which state and local authorities do not participate?

In this rule, the Commission adheres to the "realism doctrine," enunciated in its 1986 decision in *Long Island Lighting Co.* (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, which holds that in an actual emergency, state and local governmental authorities will act to protect their citizenry, and that it is appropriate for the NRC to take account of that self-evident fact in evaluating the adequacy of a utility's emergency plan. The NRC's realism doctrine is grounded squarely in common sense. As the Commission stated in *LILCO*, even where state and local officials "deny they ever would or could cooperate with [a utility] either before or even during an accident," the NRC "simply cannot accept these statements at face value." 24 NRC 22, 29 fn. 9. It would be irrational for anyone to suppose that in a real radiological emergency, state and local public officials would refuse to do what they have always done in the event of emergencies of all kinds: do their best to help protect the affected public.

The *Long Island Lighting Co.* decision included the observation that in an accident, the "best effort" of state and county officials would include utilizing the utility's plan as "the best source for emergency planning information and options." 24 NRC 22, 31. This rule leaves it to the Licensing Board to judge what form the "best efforts" of state and local officials would take. However, the rulemaking record strongly supports the proposition that state and local governments believe that a planned response is preferable to an ad hoc one. Therefore it is only reasonable to suppose that in the event of a radiological emergency, state and local officials, in the absence of a state or local radiological emergency plan approved by state and local governments, will either look to the utility and its plan for guidance or will follow some other plan that exists. Thus the presiding Licensing Board may presume that state and local governmental authorities will look to the utility for guidance and generally follow its plan in an actual emergency; however, this presumption may be

rebutted by, for example, a good faith and a timely proffer of an adequate and feasible state or local radiological response plan which would in fact be relied upon in an emergency. The presiding Licensing Board should not hesitate to reject any claim that state and local officials will refuse to act to safeguard the health and safety of the public in the event of an actual emergency. In actual emergencies, state, local, and federal officials have invariably done their utmost to protect the citizenry, as two hundred years of American history amply demonstrates.

At the present time, the Commission does not have a basis in its adjudicatory experience to judge either that a utility plan would be adequate in every case or that it would be inadequate in every case. Implementation of this rule may ultimately provide that informational basis.

The problem of how the NRC can decide the adequacy of emergency planning in the face of FEMA's declared reluctance to make judgments on emergency planning in cases of state and local non-participation does not appear insoluble. Though FEMA has expressed its reluctance to make judgments in such circumstances, because of the degree of conjecture that would in FEMA's view be called for, we do not interpret its position as one of refusal to apply its expertise to the evaluation of a utility plan. For FEMA to engage in the evaluation of a utility plan would necessitate no retreat from its stated view that it is highly desirable to have, for each nuclear power plant, a state or local plan with full state and local participation in emergency planning, including emergency exercises. (The Commission shares that view.) FEMA's advice would undoubtedly include identification of areas in which judgments are necessarily conjectural, and NRC's overall judgment on whether a utility's plan is adequate would in turn have to take account of the uncertainties included in FEMA's judgment. Beyond a certain point, uncertainty as to underlying facts would plainly make a positive finding on "reasonable assurance" increasingly difficult. These are issues, however, which can be addressed in the case-by-case adjudications on individual fact-specific situations. It should be noted that while the rule makes clear that ultimate decisional authority resides with NRC, it does envision a role for FEMA in the evaluation of utility plans, although section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 did not specify any role for

FEMA in the evaluation of utility plans (as opposed to state and local plans).

Issue #8: If this is a national policy question, why doesn't the Commission leave the issue to the Congress to resolve?

Congress did address, in 1980, the issue of what should be done in the event there is no acceptable state or local emergency plan: it directed the NRC to evaluate a state, local, or utility plan to determine whether it provided "reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned." Perhaps because it was overly optimistic that there would be an acceptable state or local plan in every case, the Commission did not, except in general terms (at 10 CFR 50.47(c)), provide in its regulations for the evaluation of a utility plan. The present rule is an effort to make up for that omission by incorporating provisions implementing the Congress's 1980 policy decision into the NRC's rules. As noted elsewhere, the 1980 statute, twice re-enacted, has expired, but the NRC does not need the specific authority of that statute to adopt this rule, which is promulgated pursuant to the NRC's general authority, under section 161(b) and other provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, to regulate the use of nuclear energy.

The House of Representatives, as has been described above, voted 261-160 on August 5, 1987 to reject an amendment which would have barred the application of this rule to two specific plants. The Congress is thus well aware of the Commission's emergency planning rulemaking.

For the Commission to terminate its rulemaking and ask the Congress to address the policy issues involved thus seems unwarranted at this time. The Commission is still well within the framework of the guidance which the Congress gave it in 1980 (and in the two re-enactments of the statute) and also well within its rulemaking authority. It has yet to carry through that guidance to the point of making an adjudicatory decision on the adequacy of a utility plan. If and when the Commission determines, through adjudications in individual cases, that there is a continuing problem which only Congressional action can solve, it can so notify the Congress, but that point has not yet been reached.

Issue #9: Doesn't the proposed rule still leave open the possibility that state or local action or inaction can have the effect of blocking operation of a plant? If so, how can the proposed rule be said to effectuate the Congressional intent that licensees not be penalized for the

inaction or inadequate action of state and local authorities?

Yes, the proposed rule does leave open the possibility that state or local non-participation can indirectly block the operation of a nuclear plant. This is so because under the particular facts of an individual case it may be impossible for the NRC to conclude that a utility plan is adequate, as defined in this rule. That does not mean, however, that the Congress's intent, as expressed in the 1980 statute and its re-enactments, is thereby frustrated. The Congress was concerned that utilities not be "penalized," but not to the extent that it was willing to countenance operation of a nuclear power plant in a situation where the public was not adequately protected. Congress intended to give a utility the opportunity to demonstrate that its plan provided "reasonable assurance," but it also provided that the NRC could not permit a plant to operate unless it found that the utility had met that burden.

Issue #10: Will the proposed rule discourage cooperation between licensees and state and local governments in emergency planning?

There is no reason to believe that the rule would discourage cooperation between licensees and state and local governments in emergency planning. Realistically, the only way in which the rule could discourage such cooperation would be if utilities were to decide that because of the new rule, they had less of an incentive to be accommodating to the needs and desires of state and local authorities. That might be a possible result if it appeared that the new rule made it easy and fast for a utility to obtain approval for its plan in cases of state and local non-participation.

In reality, it is likely to be much more difficult and time-consuming for a utility to obtain approval of its plan in the face of state and local opposition. The problems highlighted by this rulemaking are likely, if anything, to impress utilities anew with the desirability of doing everything necessary to obtain and retain full state and local participation in emergency planning.

Issue #11: Is the proposed rule based on an NRC consideration of economic costs?

The NRC rule is an effort to bring the NRC's regulations more clearly into line with a policy decision made by the Congress in 1980. The NRC's rule is thus based on economic considerations only to the extent that the Congress's policy decision of 1980 was based on economic considerations. In the Conference Report on the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 (H.96-1070, June 4, 1980), the conferees stated that they did not wish

utilities to be "penalized" in situations in which there was no acceptable state or local plan. That could be taken as a reference to economic costs or simply to considerations of fairness, in that the issue was whether a utility was to be barred from operating a plant by the actions of third parties over which it had no control.

The NRC's motivation in promulgating this rule is not economics. Its motivation is to assure that the NRC is in a position to make the decisions that Congress intended that it make, and that the Commission has declared that it would make.

Issue #12: Is the proposed rule intended to read states and localities out of the emergency planning process?

Emphatically not. The rule leaves the existing regulatory structure unchanged for cases in which state and local authorities elect to participate in emergency planning. The NRC, in common with the Congress and FEMA, regards full state and local participation in emergency planning to be necessary for optimal emergency planning. The rule change is directed to the question of what the NRC's regulatory approach should be in which states and localities decide to take themselves out of the emergency planning process. Ideally, in the NRC's view, the new rule would never have to be used, because states and localities would never refuse to participate in emergency planning.

Issue #13: Does the proposed rule alter the place of emergency planning in the overall safety finding that the Commission must make?

It does not. As described above, the Commission must make both a finding of "adequate protective measures * * * in an emergency" and an overall safety finding of "reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered" (10 CFR 50.35(c), implementing section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232). The rule does nothing to alter either the requirement that emergency planning must be found adequate or the place of emergency planning in the overall safety finding.

Issue #14: What effect if any does the proposed rule have on nuclear plants that are already in operation?

The rule does not specifically apply to plants that already have operating licenses. As described above, 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) of the Commission's regulations already provides a mechanism (the "120-day clock") for addressing situations in which deficiencies are identified in emergency planning at operating plants. To the extent that this rule provides criteria by

which a utility plan would be judged by state and local withdrawal from participation in emergency planning, those criteria would presumably be of assistance to decisionmakers in determining, under 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii), whether remedial action should be taken, and if so, what kind, where deficiencies in emergency planning remain uncorrected after 120 days.

Issue #15: Does the Commission's rule mean that the NRC does not have to find that a utility plan would offer protection equivalent to what a plan with full state and local participation would provide?

As stated previously, under the rule adopted in this notice, a utility plan, to pass muster, is required to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in emergency. The rule recognizes—as did Congress when it enacted and re-enacted the provisions of Section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980—that no utility plan is likely to be able to provide the same degree of public protection that would obtain under ideal conditions, i.e. a state or local plan with full state and local participation, but that it may nevertheless be adequate.

The Commission's rule, as modified and clarified, would establish a process by which a utility plan can be evaluated against the same standards that are used to evaluate a state or local plan (with allowances made both for those areas in which compliance is infeasible because of governmental non-participation and for the compensatory measures proposed by the utility). It must be recognized that emergency planning rules are necessarily flexible. Other than "adequacy," there is no uniform "passing grade" for emergency plans, whether they are prepared by a state, a locality, or a utility. Rather, there is a case-by-case evaluation of whether the plan meets the standard of "adequate protective measures . . . in the event of an emergency." Likewise, the acceptability of a plan for one plant is not measured against plans for other nuclear plants. The Commission, in its 1986 *LILCO* decision, stressed the need for flexibility in the evaluation of emergency plans. In that decision, the Commission observed that it "might look favorably" on a utility plan "if there was reasonable assurance that it was capable of achieving dose reductions in the event of an accident that are generally comparable to what might be accomplished with government cooperation." 24 NRC 22, 30. We do not read that decision as requiring a finding of the precise dose reductions that would be accomplished either by the

utility's plan or by a hypothetical plan that had full state and local participation: such findings are never a requirement in the evaluation of emergency plans. The final rule makes clear that every emergency plan is to be evaluated for adequacy on its own merits, without reference to the specific dose reductions which might be accomplished under the plan or to the capabilities of any other plan. It further makes clear that a finding of adequacy for any plan is to be considered generally comparable to a finding of adequacy for any other plan.

The rule change is designed to establish procedures and criteria governing the case-by-case adjudicatory evaluation, at the operating license review stage, of the adequacy of emergency planning in situations in which state and/or local authorities decline to participate further in emergency planning. It is not intended to assure the licensing of any particular plant or plants. The rule is intended to remedy the omission of specific procedures for the evaluation of a utility plan from the NRC's existing rules, adopted in 1980. In providing for the evaluation of a utility plan, however, the rule represents no departure from the approach envisioned in 1980 by the Congress and by the Commission. In 1980, the supplementary information to NRC's final rule stated that the rule was consistent with the approach taken by Congress in Section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 (which, in a compromise between House and Senate versions, provided for the NRC to evaluate a utility's emergency plan in situations where a state or local plan was either nonexistent or inadequate), though the rule itself included no explicit provisions governing the NRC's evaluation of a utility plan in such circumstances. It should be emphasized that the rule is not intended to diminish public protection from the levels previously established by the Congress or the Commission's rules, since the Commission's rules and the Congress have since 1980 provided for a two-tier approach to emergency planning. The rule takes as its starting point the Congressional policy decision reflected in section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980. That statute adopted a two-tier approach to emergency planning. The preferred approach was for operating licenses to be issued upon a finding that there is a "State or local radiological emergency response plan . . . which complies with the Commission's standards for such plans," but failing that, it also permitted licensing on a showing that there is a

"State, local, or utility plan which provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned."

Under the Commission's 1980 rules, the regulatory provision that implemented the second of the two tiers of Section 109 was general and unspecific. The relevant regulation, 10 CFR 50.47(c), allowed a nuclear power plant to be licensed to operate, notwithstanding its failure to comply with the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b), on a showing that "deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating measures have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operation," without defining those terms further. The Commission currently believes that the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), which are used to evaluate a state or local plan, also provide an appropriate framework to evaluate a utility plan. Therefore, the new rule provides for the first time that where a utility plan is submitted, in a situation of state and/or local non-participation in emergency planning, it will be evaluated for adequacy against the same standards used to evaluate a state or local plan. However, due allowance will be made both for the non-participation of the state and/or local governmental authorities and for the compensatory measures proposed by the utility in reaching a determination whether there is "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures" can and will be taken.

The approach reflected in this rule amplifies and clarifies the guidance provided in the Commission's decision in *Long Island Lighting Co.*, (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 (1986). The rule incorporates the "realism doctrine," set forth in that decision, which holds that in an actual emergency, state and local governmental authorities will act to protect the public, and that it is appropriate therefore for the NRC, in evaluating the adequacy of a utility's emergency plan, to take into account the probable response of state and local authorities, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

That decision also included language which could be interpreted as envisioning that the NRC must estimate the radiological dose reductions which a utility plan would achieve, compare them with the radiological dose reductions which would be achieved if there were a state or local plan with full

state and local participation in emergency planning, and permit licensing only if the dose reductions are "generally comparable." Such an interpretation would be contrary to NRC practice, under which emergency plans are evaluated for adequacy without reference to numerical dose reductions which might be accomplished, and without comparing them to other emergency plans, real or hypothetical. The final rule makes clear that every emergency plan is to be evaluated for adequacy on its own merits, without reference to the specific dose reductions which might be accomplished under the plan or to the capabilities of any other plan. It further makes clear that a finding of adequacy for any plan is to be considered generally comparable to a finding of adequacy for any other plan.

The *Long Island Lighting Co.* decision included the observation that in an accident, the "best effort" of state and county officials would include utilizing the utility's plan as "the best source for emergency planning information and options." 24 NRC 22, 31. This rule leaves it to the Licensing Board to judge what form the "best efforts" of state and local officials would take, but that judgment would be made in accordance with certain guidelines set forth in the rule and explained further below. The rulemaking record strongly supports the proposition that state and local governments believe that a planned response is preferable to an ad hoc one. Therefore it is only reasonable to suppose that in the event of a radiological emergency, state and local officials, in the absence of a state or local radiological emergency plan approved by state and local governments, will either look to the utility and its plan for guidance or will follow some other plan that exists. Thus, the presiding Licensing Board may presume that state and local governmental authorities will look to the utility for guidance and generally follow its plan in an actual emergency; however, this presumption may be rebutted by, for example, a good faith and timely proffer or an adequate and feasible state or local radiological response plan which would in fact be relied upon in an emergency. The presiding Licensing Board should not hesitate to reject any claim that state and local officials will refuse to act to safeguard the health and safety of the public in the event of an actual emergency. In actual emergencies, state, local, and federal officials have invariably done their utmost to protect the citizenry, as two hundred years of American history amply demonstrates.

The rule thus establishes the framework by which the adequacy of emergency planning, in cases of state and/or local non-participation, can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in operating license proceedings. The rule does not presuppose, nor does it dictate, what the outcome of that case-by-case evaluation will be. As with other issues adjudicated in NRC proceedings, the outcome of case-by-case evaluations of the adequacy of emergency planning using a utility's plan will be subject to multiple layers of administrative review within the Commission and to judicial review in the courts.

Backfit Analysis

This amendment does not impose any new requirements on production or utilization facilities; it only provides an alternative method to meet the Commission's emergency planning regulations. The amendment therefore is not a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109 and a backfit analysis is not required.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule applies only to nuclear power plant licensees which are electric utility companies dominant in their service areas. These licensees are not "small entities" as set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act and do not meet the small business size standards set forth in Small Business Administration regulations in 13 CFR Part 121.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval No. 3150-0011.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50

Antitrust, Classified information, Fire protection, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and Recordkeeping requirements.

Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact

The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a

major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. The Commission has prepared, in support of this finding, an environmental assessment which is available for inspection and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC.

Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis for this regulation. This analysis further examines the costs and benefits of the proposed action and the alternatives considered by the Commission. The analysis is available for inspection and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the Commission is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50:

PART 50—DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 148, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91 and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273), secs. 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); secs. 50.10 (b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and secs. 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

§ 50.47 [Amended]

2. In 10 CFR Part 50, paragraph (c)(1) of § 50.47 is revised to read as follows:

(c)(1) Failure to meet the applicable standards set forth in paragraph (b) of this section may result in the

Commission declining to issue an operating license; however, the applicant will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operations. Where an applicant for an operating license asserts that its inability to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section results wholly or substantially from the decision of state and/or local governments not to participate further in emergency planning, an operating license may be issued if the applicant demonstrates to the Commission's satisfaction that:

(i) The applicant's inability to comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section is wholly or substantially the result of the non-participation of state and/or local governments.

(ii) The applicant has made a sustained, good faith effort to secure and retain the participation of the pertinent state and/or local governmental authorities, including the furnishing of copies of its emergency plan.

(iii) The applicant's emergency plan provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned. To make that finding, the applicant must demonstrate that, as outlined below, adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. A utility plan will be evaluated against the same planning standards applicable to a state or local plan, as listed in paragraph (b) of this section, with due allowance made both for—

(A) Those elements for which state and/or local non-participation makes compliance infeasible and

(B) The utility's measures designed to compensate for any deficiencies resulting from state and/or local non-participation.

In making its determination on the adequacy of a utility plan, the NRC will recognize the reality that in an actual emergency, state and local government officials will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public. The NRC will determine the adequacy of that expected response, in combination with the utility's compensating measures, on a case-by-case basis, subject to the following guidance. In addressing the circumstance where applicant's inability to comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section is wholly or

substantially the result of non-participation of state and/or local governments, it may be presumed that in the event of an actual radiological emergency state and local officials would generally follow the utility plan. However, this presumption may be rebutted by, for example, a good faith and timely proffer of an adequate and feasible state and/or local radiological emergency plan that would in fact be relied upon in a radiological emergency.

Appendix E—[Amended]

3. In 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, a new paragraph 6 is added to section IV.F to read as follows:

6. The participation of state and local governments in an emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant has identified those governments as refusing to participate further in emergency planning activities, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1). In such cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or licensee and such governmental entities as elect to participate in the emergency planning process.

Dated at Washington, DC, this 29th day of October, 1987.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk,

Secretary of the Commission.

[Editorial note: The following regulatory analysis and environmental assessment will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations]

Regulatory Analysis—Evaluation of the Adequacy of Offsite Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Offsite Emergency Planning

Statement of the Problem

In 1980, Congress enacted provisions dealing with emergency planning for nuclear power plants in the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980. Section 109 of that Act provided for the NRC to review a utility's emergency plan in situations in which a state or local emergency plan either did not exist or was inadequate. The NRC published regulations later than year that were designed to be consistent with the Congressionally mandated approach, but they did not include specific mention of utility plans. The absence of such a provision has led to uncertainty about the NRC's authority to consider a utility plan and the criteria by which such a plan would be judged. The present rulemaking is designed to clarify both the NRC's obligation to consider a utility plan at the operating license stage in cases of state and/or local non-participation in emergency planning and the standards against which such a plan would be evaluated.

Objective

The objective of the proposed amendments are to implement the policy underlying the 1980 Authorization Act and to resolve, for future licensing, what offsite emergency

planning criteria should apply where state or local governments decide not to participate in offsite emergency planning or preparedness.

Alternatives

Five alternatives were considered, including leaving the existing rules unchanged. The pros and cons of these alternatives are discussed in the rule preamble published in the Federal Register.

Consequences

NRC

The amendments will probably not impact on NRC resources currently being used in licensing cases because current NRC policy, developed in the adjudicatory case law, is to evaluate utility plans as possible interim compensating actions under 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1). Thus, while there could be extensive litigation and review regarding whether the rule's criteria are met, this would likely be similar to the review and litigation under current practice.

Other Government Agencies

No impact on other agency resources should result with the possible exception that FEMA will need to devote resources to develop criteria for review of utility plans and/or to review the plans on a case-by-case basis.

Industry

Impacts on the industry are speculative because there is no way to predict, in advance of their actual application, whether any particular utility plan will satisfy the rule. However, industry should generally benefit from knowing that rules are in place so that plans for compliance can be formulated.

Public

Under the rule being adopted a utility plan, to pass muster, is required to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency. The rule recognizes—as did Congress when it enacted and re-enacted the provisions of Section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980—that while no utility plan is likely to be able to provide precisely the same degree of public protection that would obtain under ideal conditions, i.e. a state or local plan with full state and local participation, such a plan may nevertheless be adequate. The rule starts from the premise that accidents can happen, and that at every plant, adequate emergency planning measures are needed to protect the public in the event an accident occurs. Whether in fact a particular utility plan will be found adequate would be a matter for adjudication in individual licensing proceedings.

Impact on Other Requirements

The proposed amendments would not affect other NRC requirements.

Constraints

No constraints have been identified that affect implementation of the proposed amendments.

Decision Rationale

The decision rationale is set forth in detail in the preamble to the rule change published in the *Federal Register*.

Implementation

The rule should become effective 30 days after publication in the *Federal Register*. Implementation will involve cooperation with FEMA and the development of FEMA/NRC criteria for review of utility plans may be required before the rule is applied to specific cases.

Environmental Assessment for Amendments to Emergency Planning Regulations Dealing With Evaluation of Offsite Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Offsite Emergency Planning

Identification of the Action

The Commission is amending its regulations to provide criteria for the evaluation at the operating license stage of offsite emergency planning where, because of the non-participation of state and/or local governmental authorities, a utility has proposed its own emergency plan.

The Need for the Action

As described in the *Federal Register* notice accompanying the final rule, the Commission's emergency planning regulations, promulgated in 1980, did not explicitly discuss the evaluation of a utility emergency plan, although Congress expressly provided that in the absence of a state or local emergency plan, or in cases where a state or local plan was inadequate, the NRC should consider a utility plan. That omission has led to uncertainty as to whether the NRC is empowered to consider a utility plan in cases of state and/or local non-participation, as well as about what the standards for the evaluation of such a plan would be.

Alternatives Considered

The Commission published a proposed rule change on March 6, 1987, at 52 FR 6980. In deciding on a final rule, the Commission considered four options in addition to the one reflected in the final rule. These were: issuance of the rule as originally proposed and described; issuance of a rule making clear that in cases of state and/or local non-participation, licenses could be issued on the basis of the utility's best efforts; issuance of a rule barring the issuance of licenses in cases of state and/or local non-participation; and termination of the rulemaking without the issuance of any rule change.

Environmental Impacts of the Action

The rule does not alter in any way the requirement that for an operating license to be issued, emergency planning for the plant in question must be adequate. The rule is designed to effectuate the second track of the two-track approach adopted by the Congress in the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 and two successive authorization acts, as described in detail in the *Federal Register* notice. The rule does not affect the place of emergency planning in the overall safety finding which the Commission must make

prior to the licensing of any plant. Accordingly, the rule change does not diminish public protection and has no environmental impact.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

A summary of the very numerous comments appears as part of the *Federal Register* notice. Shortly before presenting an options paper to the Commission, NRC representatives briefed representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency on the contents of the options paper.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based on the above, the Commission has decided not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the rule changes.

[FR Doc. 87-25439 Filed 11-2-87; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 208

[Regulation H; Docket No. R-0615]

Agricultural Loan Loss Amortization

AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

ACTION: Final rule with request for comments.

SUMMARY: This regulation implements Title VIII of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 ("CEBA") which permits state member agricultural banks to amortize losses on qualified agricultural loans. The regulation describes the procedures and standards applicable to state member banks desiring to amortize losses under that statute. It also describes the manner in which such amortizations are to be done. Title VIII of CEBA requires regulations implementing Title VIII to be issued not less than 90 days after enactment, that is, by November 9, 1987. Therefore, the Board is publishing the rule as a final rule effective November 9, 1987, for the Call Report for December 31, 1987, but is allowing interested parties to comment through December 3, 1987. Should changes be indicated by the comments, the Board will endeavor to adopt them shortly after the close of the comment period but before the Call Report for December 31, 1987, is filed. Banks wishing to amortize losses may file an application any time after publication of the rule.

DATES: The rule will be effective November 9, 1987, and the first Call Report affected will be the Call Report for December 31, 1987. Comments must be received on or before December 3, 1987.

ADDRESSES: All comments should refer to Docket No. R-0615 and should be mailed to William W. Wiles, Secretary,

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551, or delivered to Room B-2223, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC, between 8:45 a.m. and 5:15 p.m. weekdays. Comments may be inspected in Room B-1122 between 8:45 a.m. and 5:15 p.m. weekdays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rhoger H. Pugh, Manager (202) 728-5883, Stanley B. Rediger, Senior Financial Analyst (202) 452-2629, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation (202) 728-5883; Helen Lewis (202) 452-3490, Economist, Financial Reports Section, Division of Research and Statistics; or John Harry Jorgenson, Senior Attorney (202) 452-3778, Legal Division; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired ONLY, Telecommunications Device for the Deaf, Earnestine Hill or Dorothea Thompson, (202) 452-3544.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Title VIII of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 ("CEBA") permits agricultural banks to amortize: (1) Losses on qualified agricultural loans shown on its annual financial statement for any year between December 31, 1983 and January 1, 1992; and (2) losses suffered as the result of an appraisal of other assets (related to a qualified agricultural loan) that it owned on January 1, 1983, or acquires prior to January 1, 1992. Title VIII of CEBA also requires that the federal banking agencies issue implementing regulations no later than 90 days after the effective date of the Act (that is, no later than November 9, 1987). This regulation is intended to comply with this requirement. The other federal banking agencies (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")) are proposing substantially identical regulations containing only technical variations necessary to accommodate their own regulatory and organizational systems. The standards to be applied are unchanged.

Statutory Requirements for Loan Loss Amortization

Title VIII of CEBA includes the following elements: (1) To be eligible to amortize losses, a bank must meet the following requirements:

(a) Its deposits must be insured by the FDIC;

(b) It must be located in an area the economy of which is dependent upon agriculture;

(c) It must have assets of \$100 million or less;