15, 1973). The firm concerned has the burden of establishing not only that it has actually incurred those increased costs, but also that the increased costs it computes as attributable to the cost of transportation do not exceed such third-party rate increases for comparable services.

The same rationale applies to the issue presented here. The fees paid by International Corporation (a reseller subsidiary of Cities Service) to the operator of the proposed facility (IFC) to unload foreign liquefied gas products may be considered transportation costs. Cities Service should not be disadvantaged because it takes the initiative to provide part of the transportation of the products concerned into its inventory through the IFC subsidiary. These transportation costs may then be included in Cities Service's landed cost under § 212.82, and increases in such costs may be reflected in the firm's "increased costs of purchased products." Since International Corporation and IFC are all part of the same "firm," as defined in § 212.82, however, increases in such transportation costs charged by affiliated entities are limited by increases in comparable fees charged by other firms.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on June 12, 1980.

Merrill F. Hathaway, Jr.,

Acting Assistant General Counsel for Interpretations and Rulings.

Appendix B.—*Responses to Petitions for Reconsideration*

Petitioner	Interpretation	Date of response
Ashland Oil, Inc., Clark Oil & Refining Corp., Energy Cooperative, Inc.	*Consumers Power Company*, 1979-26, 45 FR 5663 (January 24, 1980).	May 27.
Amoco Oil Company	*Consumers Power Company*, 1979-26 45 FR 5663 (January 24, 1980).	May 27.

Petition for Reconsideration

Interpretation: Consumers Power Company.

Petitioners: Ashland Oil, Inc., Clark Oil & Refining Corp Energy Cooperative, Inc.

Date: May 27, 1980.

This responds to your petition submitted on behalf of Ashland Oil, Inc., Clark Oil & Refining Corp., and Energy Cooperative, Inc., as supplemented by our letter of May 5, 1980, seeking reconsideration of *Consumers Power Company*, Interpretation 1979-26, 45 FR 5663 (January 24, 1980). For the reasons discussed below, we have concluded that the petition for reconsideration must be denied.

Interpretations issued by the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Energy (DOE) may be reconsidered only in certain limited circumstances. In such cases, the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the Interpretation was erroneous in fact or in law, or that the result reached in the Interpretation was arbitrary or capricious. 10 CFR 205.85(f).

Interpretation 1979-26 concluded that Consumers Power Company (Consumers) owns and operates a feedstock preparation unit that processes crude oil and manufactures refined petroleum products. Thus, Consumers qualifies as a refiner pursuant to the definitions set forth in 10 CFR 211.51 and 211.62. As a refiner, Consumers is eligible for participation in the entitlements program, 10 CFR 211.67, and Consumers may include the volumes of lease condensate and Canadian plant condensate in its volume of crude oil runs to stills in accordance with § 211.67(d)(3), effective June 17, 1976, the date Consumers requested inclusion in the entitlements program.

Your petition raises a number of arguments to support your view that Interpretation 1979-26 is erroneous. We have given careful consideration to each argument presented. You contend that the Interpretation is contrary to the basic purposes of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, as amended, Pub. L. No 93-159 (November 27, 1973)[1] by allowing the inclusion of a type of facility, a synthetic natural gas (SNG) plant, that cannot be considered a refinery, and has the effect of allegedly encouraging the allocation of scarce petroleum resources to the manufacture of SNG. Interpretation 1979-26 is based, however, upon the determination that under the applicable DOE regulations the Marysville feedstock preparation unit is a crude oil refinery. The arguments you raise do not alter the fact that the firm owns and operates a refinery and therefore has a right to receive the benefits of the entitlements program.

Equally without merit are your contentions that Interpretation 1979-26 is procedurally deficient. You argue, *inter alia*, that the Interpretation was issued without notice and comment and failed to make the necessary determination that the process at Consumers' feedstock preparation unit constitutes "crude oil runs to stills" under 10 CFR 211.67. As Interpretation 1979-26 merely clarified existing DOE regulations, notice and comment was not required before its issuance. Based on the uncontroverted facts presented, Interpretation 1979-26 properly determined that the Marysville feedstock preparation unit distills crude oil. There is no legal authority or factual basis to assert that the regulatory term "crude oil runs to stills" requires the use of a specific type of distillation equipment not used by Consumers.

Inasmuch as you have failed to demonstrate that the Interpretation is erroneous in fact or in law, or that the Interpretation is arbitrary or capricious, the petition for reconsideration is hereby denied. The denial of the petition for reconsideration is a final order of the Department of Energy from which the petitioner may seek judicial review.

Petition for Reconsideration

Interpretation: Consumer Power Company

Petitioner: Amoco Oil Company

Date: May 27, 1980

This responds to your petition submitted on behalf of Amoco Oil Company, seeking reconsideration of *Consumer Power Company*, Interpretation 1979-26, 45 FR 5663 (January 24, 1980). For the reasons discussed below, we have concluded that the petition for reconsideration must be denied.

Interpretations issued by the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Energy (DOE) may be reconsidered only in certain limited circumstances. In such cases, the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the Interpretation was erroneous in fact or in law, or that the result reached in the Interpretation was arbitrary or capricious. 10 CFR 205.85(f).

Interpretation 1979-26 concluded that Consumers Power Company (Consumers) owns and operates a feedstock preparation unit that processes crude oil and manufactures refined petroleum products. Thus, Consumers qualifies as a refiner pursuant to the definitions set forth in 10 CFR 211.51 and 211.62. As a refiner Consumers is eligible for participation in the entitlements program, 10 CFR 211.67, and Consumers may include the volumes of lease condensate and Canadian plant condensate in its volume of crude oil runs to stills in accordance with § 211.67(d)(3), effective June 17, 1976, the date Consumers requested inclusion in the entitlements program.

Your petition raises a number of arguments to support your view that Interpretation 1979-26 is erroneous. We have given careful consideration to each argument presented. You contend that Consumers is a public utility, not a refiner. The arguments you raise do not alter the fact that the firm owns and operates a refinery and therefore has a right to receive the benefits of the entitlements program.

We also disagree with your contention that Interpretation 1979-26 addressed a moot issue, because the implementation of the legal determinations may require refiners to purchase entitlements from Consumers.

Inasmuch as Amoco has failed to demonstrate that the Interpretation is erroneous in fact or in law, or tht the Interpretation is arbitrary or capricious, the petition for reconsideration is hereby denied. The denial of the petition for reconsideration is a final order of the Department of Energy from which the petitioner may seek judicial review.

Appendix C.—Cases Dismissed

File No.	Requester	Category	Date dismissed
A-535.	Chevron U.S.A., Inc.	Allocation	May 15.
A-525.	Tesoro Petroleum Company	Allocation	May 15.
A-487.	Mitchell Energy Corporation	Price	May 15.
A-470.	Charles Hohl & Sons, Inc	Allocation	May 29.
A-329.	Crude Oil Purchasing, Inc	Price	June 2.
A-534.	T.E. Bird	Price and allocation.	June 2.
A-531.	Osceola Refining Company	Allocation	June 3.

[FR Doc. 80-19043 Filed 6-23-80; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-M

[1] 15 U.S.C. 751 *et seq.* (1976).

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

14 CFR Part 399

[Policy Statements Amdt. No. 72 to Part 399; Docket No. 34683; PS-95]

Statements of General Policy

AGENCY: Civil Aeronautics Board.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Board is issuing a final rule which amends our interim suspension policy on standard industry fare levels for intrastate pairs of points in California, Texas, and Florida. We are accelerating the formula under which the Standard Industry Fare Level for use in constructing the intrastate fare ceilings was to be gradually adjusted to bring them to the level of the interstate standard industry fare level for those markets. Effective immediately, the ceiling fares for each intrastate market shall be determined according to the PS-94 ceiling formula.

DATES: Adopted: June 17, 1980. Effective: June 17, 1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Laurie Schaffer, Trial Attorney, Bureau of Domestic Aviation, (202) 673-5009, or Mark Kahan, Assistant Director, Fares, Rates, and Tariffs, Bureau of Domestic Aviation, (202) 673-5371, Civil Aeronautics Board, 1825 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20428.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provided for the preemption of the authority of the individual states to regulate the fares charged and the miles flown within the states by airlines authorized by the Board to engage in interstate air transportation.[1] As a result, jurisdiction vested in the Board over all authority of any air carrier authorized by the Board to engage in interstate air transportation, including its operations in intrastate markets.

At the time of the passage of the Act, there was a marked difference between the interstate fare policies promulgated by us in the *Domestic Passenger-Fare Rulemaking,* PS-80, 43 FR 39522, September 5, 1978, and the fare policies adopted by the individual states to govern air transportation within their jurisdiction. In general, the states adopted policies which kept the intrastate fares at an artificially low level. The fares in many intrastate markets were frequently 50 percent below the interstate fare for the same distances at the time PS-82, 44 FR 9940, Feburary 15, 1979 was adopted. In order to avoid a collision between the two systems and prevent abrupt changes in the interstate fare systems which would involve enormous increases in air fares, we decided to standardize the levels by bringing intrastate fare ceilings in line with the level of the interstate ceiling through a gradual formula. Specifically, we adopted as the standard industry fare level between intrastate pairs of points, predominantly the fare charged on July 1, 1977, updated according to section 1002(d)(6) of the Federal Aviation Act plus an additional 10 percent.[2] In addition, the fare ceilings would be increased by eight percent beginning July 1, 1979, and every six months thereafter until either they reached the ceilings determined by our policies for the interstate markets or until January 1, 1981, at which time they would be set at the interstate level.

PS-82 was intended as an interim rule and was accompanied by a request for comments (PSDR-55, 44 FR 9933, February 15, 1979). Comments were received from Eastern Airlines, the State of California and the California Public Utilities Commission and Pacific Southwest Airlines.

In addition to these comments, the Board received on November 21, 1979, an application from United Airlines for a waiver to allow United to increase its intrastate California fares by 25 percent.[3] To justify its application, United referred to changed circumstances in the airline industry and the California markets since the effective date of PS-82. In this period of time, the carrier reported a substantial decline in profits and rapidly rising costs: in particular, a sharp increase in the price of jet fuel.

At the time United filed its application for a waiver, we also received indications from another carrier that the markets in California were experiencing service losses greater than were evident in the rest of the country, and that there was a reasonable connection between the low fares and California's service problems. Because of the changing circumstances as noted by United, and the potential impact of the Board's fare policies, a re-examination of the acceleration of the SIFL proposed in PS-82 seemed desirable.

II. Establishment of Equalized Fare Ceilings

We issued a Supplementary Notice of Requests for comments (PSDR-55B, 45 FR 2018, January 10, 1980) and received comments from Hughes Airwest, Pacific Southwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and United Airlines. No comments on this notice were received from any non-carrier interests. All of the comments supported an acceleration of the PS-82 timetable, although different implementation dates were suggested. Hughes Airwest and Pacific Southwest Airlines recommeded that the intrastate fare levels should be allowed to rise immediately or as soon as possible to the interstate fare levels. Southwest Airlines indicated that it expected its fares would remain well below the Board's fare ceilings, so an acceleration would not directly affect them. However, the carrier argued that a rapid lifting of the ceiling was in agreement with its basic economic philosophy. United recommended that the formula be accelerated by six months with the intrastate fare ceilings reaching full equalization with the interstate fare levels on July 1, 1980.

Although the California Public Utilities Commission did not respond to the supplementary notice, they opposed the adoption of the interim rule on the basis that it exceeded the Board's authority. Specifically, they argued that the Board's determination that the standard industry fare level should be related to nationwide average costs as determined in the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation was inconsistent with the intent of the Act.[4] According to

[1] Section 105(a)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act, as amended by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 105(a)(1).

[2] In general this fare would be the prime time, unrestricted, lowest commuter class fare in California and standard class in Texas and Florida.

[3] Docket 31290.

[4] In addition to commenting on the Board's interpretation of "standard industry fare level" the comments also addressed two other aspects of the Board's policies which the Commission believed were contrary to the intent of the Act. The first was the method of equalizing the interstate and intrastate fare ceilings by providing for percentage increases in the intrastate ceilings above the "changes in cost" as described in § 1002(d)(7). The Commission argued that providing percentage increases above the statutory provisions was contrary to the intent of the Act. This position is clearly based on a misconception of Congressional intent and our authority to adopt zones of reasonableness that differ from those specified in the Act. The intent of the Act was to insure that we did not return to application of more restrictive policies and not to prohibit us from adopting more flexible fare policies than provided in the Act. The objective of the Act is to move toward full competition and total fare deregulation. Consequently, the Act does not prohibit us from stating the circumstances under which we believe as a matter of policy competition rather than regulation should be permitted to determine fare levels and service offerings.

The final comment of the Commission was that the failure of the Board to oversee the filing by air carriers under the Board's jurisdiction of rate increases for intrastate markets in excess of the ceiling specified in Section 1002(d)(4)(a) of the Act,

Footnotes continued on next page

C.P.U.C., the standard industry fare level should be the actual intrastate fares in effect on July 1, 1977 in those markets.

In adopting the interim rule, we concluded that while either interpretation of section 1002(d)(6)(a) was reasonable, the interpretation of the standard industry fare level as determined on the basis of the actual cost formula was a realistic reflection of the manner in which Congress understood the concept of standard industry fare level and avoids a continuing disparity in fare ceilings which could threaten service. As PS-82 explained, the application of the *DPFI* formula to the intrastate markets will result in the uniform application of fare policies throughout the country which is a primary objective of the Federal pre-emption provision of the Act.[5]

No comments or opposition to the supplementary notice's proposed accelerated equalization of the intrastate fare ceilings were received. The remaining issue to be addressed is the appropriate date for the implementation of this proposal. We believe that intrastate fare ceilings should be permitted to rise to interstate levels immediately. California has only 8.19 percent of the originating cities in the United States, but now accounts for over 18 percent of the total requests to withdraw service.[6] We agree with several of the commenters that allowing the fare ceilings to rise to the equivalent interstate ceilings should create desirable incentives for carriers to maintain existing services and consider opportunities for new entry. Prior to this action, the intrastate markets have been at a disadvantage as a result of the artificially low fares which required a carrier to operate at profit levels lower than could be achieved elsewhere.

Since the supplementary notice was issued, we have been very liberal in granting fare increases above the zones permitted by the interim rule. The scope of these zones above and below the standard industry fare levels is the same as in the interstate markets and, of course, with the issuance of this final rule will continue to be. We recently broadened these zones to allow carriers further fare flexibility. (PS-94; 45 FR 40969; June 17, 1980.) In markets under 200 miles, the carriers will generally have full upward and downward fare flexibility. The carriers in these markets will be able to set fares at a level determined by competition. For all markets above 200 miles, there will also be full downward flexibility and between 200-400 miles, carriers may generally set fares as much as 50 percent above the standard industry fare level. In markets above 400 miles, fares may be set 30 percent above the SIFL. By broadening the scope of these zones and the issuance of this final rule, which will bring uniformity to the fare structures throughout the 48 contiguous states, we are also moving closer to our announced goal that fares, to the maximum extent feasible, be determined by competition as opposed to regulation.

III. Final Rule

In accordance with the above determinations, the existing intrastate fare ceilings will be permitted to rise to the interstate fare ceiling, effective immediately. The SIFL for each market will be the level that it would be if the market were an interstate one whose predominant fare in effect on July 1, 1977 was the DPFI Formula Fare. Fares can be set above the SIFL as set forth in § 399.32, as amended by PS-94.

We are also deleting a sentence from § 399.37, *Joint fares*. That sentence had authorized the use of the interstate formula fares (instead of the lower intrastate fares) in constructing joint fares) that involve an intrastate flight leg. Now that the intrastate SIFL has reached the interstate level, this provision is unnecessary.

Accordingly, the Civil Aeronautics Board amends 14 CFR Part 399, *Statements of General Policy*, as follows:

1. In § 399.31, paragraph (d) is revised to read:

§ 399.31 Standard industry fare level.

(a) *Generally*. Except as set forth in paragraph (d) of this section, the standard industry fare level ("SIFL") for coach/standard service in a market is equal to the predominant fare in effect in that market on July 1, 1977, as adjusted by the Board for cost increases.

* * * * *

(d) *Intrastate markets in California, Florida, and Texas*. For each of these markets, the SIFL is equal to the level that it would be if the market were an interstate one whose predominant fare on July 1, 1977, was the DPFI formula fare.

2. In § 399.37, the second sentence of paragraph (a) is deleted, so that the paragraph reads:

§ 399.37 Joint fares.

* * * * *

(a) *Level*. The level shall not exceed the sum of the maximum local fares permitted by this subpart minus one tax-rounded coach ceiling terminal charge for each interline connection, and in any event shall not exceed the sum of the actual local fares.

* * * * *

(Secs. 204, 403, 404, and 1002 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 72 Stat. 743, 758, 760, and 788, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1324, 1373, 1374, and 1482))

By the Civil Aeronautics Boards.

Phyllis T. Kaylor,

Secretary.

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or to investigate and suspend such rates, if not just and reasonable will constitute a dereliction of the Board's duty under Sections 1002(d)(1) and 1002(9). As in the other comments of the Commission, this comment was not supported by factual data indicating that a dereliction of duty had occurred or was going to occur. Therefore, it is premature and without merit. If in the future, the commission finds that a fare filed is outside the zone or unjust, they should file a complaint as specified by the Act. We will also review on our own any filing which is outside the zone to determine its reasonableness.

[5] §105(a)(1).

[6] A memorandum on this subject has been placed in the docket. Although not all the California points have been threatened with the complete loss of service, many have experienced some service disruptions. For example, there are 663 originating cities listed in the Board's *Report on Airlines Service, Fares, Traffic, Load Factors, and Market Shares*, August 1979, and 53 or 8.1 percent are located in California. Of these cities, 298 lost some service during the period July 1, 1978 to July 1, 1979. Twenty-eight of these cities (9.4 percent) were located in California.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

21 CFR Part 81

[Docket No. 79C-0053]

General Specifications and General Restrictions for Provisional Color Additives for Use in Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics; Postponement of Closing Date for Provisional Listing of Lead Acetate

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is postponing the closing date for the provisional listing of lead acetate for use as a color additive in cosmetics that color the hair on the scalp. A new closing date for lead acetate is being established to provide time for publishing a regulation in the Federal Register announcing the final decision by FDA either to approve or deny the petition for the permanent listing of lead acetate. The new closing date will be October 31, 1980.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 24, 1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gerad L. McCowin, Bureau of Foods (HFF-334), Food and Drug

Administration, 200 C St. SW., Washington, DC 20204, 202-472-5690.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The current closing date of June 30, 1980, for the provisional listing of lead acetate was established by a regulation published in the **Federal Register** of February 22, 1980 (45 FR 11799). The June 30, 1980 closing date for lead acetate was established to conform to the comment period on the agency's advance notice of proposed rulemaking concerning lead in food (44 FR 67673; November 27, 1979).

In the regulation of February 22, 1980, FDA announced its intention either to approve or deny the petition for the permanent listing of lead acetate by May 30, 1980. A final decision regarding the petition for the color additive would be based upon supporting scientific information in the petition and review and evaluation of other pertinent information including comments and scientific information submitted in response to the advance notice of proposed rulemaking request for data.

The review and evaluation of the data relevant to the use of lead acetate as a hair dye has taken longer than FDA expected. Therefore, FDA has concluded that a short extension is necessary to complete procedural requirements and publish the required **Federal Register** documents outlining the final decision by FDA regarding the petition for lead acetate for use as a color additive. Therefore, the regulation set forth below will postpone the June 30, 1980 closing date for the provisional listing of lead acetate until October 31, 1980.

Because of the shortness of time until the June 30, 1980 closing date, FDA has concluded that use of a notice and public procedure on this regulation is impracticable and that good cause exists for issuing this postponement as a final rule.

This regulation will permit the uninterrupted use of this color additive until October 31, 1980. To prevent any interruption in the provisional listing of lead acetate, and in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(d) (1) and (3), this regulation is being made effective on June 24, 1980.

Therefore under the Transitional Provisions of the Color Additive Amendments of 1960 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Title II, Pub. L. 86-618; sec. 203, 74 Stat. 404-407 (21 U.S.C. 376 note)) and under authority delegated to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (21 CFR 5.1), Part 81 is amended as follows:

§ 81.1 [Amended]

1. In § 81.1 *Provisional lists of color additives,* by revising the closing date for "Lead acetate" in paragraph (g) to read "October 31, 1980".

§ 81.27 [Amended]

2. In § 81.27 *Conditions of provisional listing of additives,* by revising the closing date for "Lead acetate" in paragraph (b) to read "October 31, 1980".

Effective date. This regulation is effective June 24, 1980.

(Sec. 203, 74 Stat. 404-407 (21 U.S.C. 376 note))

Dated: June 16, 1980.

Joseph P. Hile,

Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs.

[FR Doc. 80-18598 Filed 6-23-80; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4110-03-M

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21 CFR Part 444

[Docket No. 77N-0235]

Neomycin Palmitate-Trypsin-Chymotrypsin Ointment; Final Order on Objections and Request for a Hearing Regarding Withdrawal of Approval of New Drug Application

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration.

ACTION: Termination of Postponement of Effective Date.

SUMMARY: The Commissioner of Food and Drugs denies a hearing, withdraws approval of the new drug application for Biozyme Ointment, and terminates the postponement of the effective date for the revocation of certain regulations that apply to the product. The drug has been used to treat certain localized infections.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 24, 1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Wilson, Bureau of Drugs (HFD-32), Food and Drug Administration, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20857, 301-443-3650.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In a notice (DESI 50020) published in the **Federal Register** of July 8, 1972 (37 FR 13497), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced its evaluation of a report received from the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, Drug Efficacy Study Group (NAS/NRC) on the combination drug Biozyme Ointment (NDA 50-020, held by Armour Pharmaceutical Co., Division Armour and Co., Greyhound Tower, Phoenix, AZ 85077) containing neomycin palmitate and trypsin-chymotrypsin concentrate. The notice stated that the prescription drug is possibly effective for the claimed indications for treatment of localized infections or for suppressive therapy in such conditions. It also invited the submission of additional data to provide substantial evidence of the effectiveness of the drug.

In response to the July 8, 1972 notice, Armour submitted data for FDA to review. In a final rule published in the **Federal Register** of November 11, 1977 (42 FR 58739), the drug was reclassified to lacking substantial evidence of effectiveness because the studies in the original new drug application did not compare results of treatment with Biozyme to any control and the studies subsequently submitted in response to the July 8, 1972 notice did not compare treatment to a control that would show the claimed effectiveness of the enzymes alone. In addition, none of these studies showed the contribution of each of the components to the claimed effect and thus did not comply with the requirements for combination drugs. Therefore, these studies did not meet the statutory and regulatory standards for an adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation. The provisions for certification were revoked and an opportunity for a hearing was offered. Subsequently, Armour filed a hearing request and data on behalf of its product. In a notice published in the **Federal Register** of March 10, 1978 (43 FR 9801), the effective date of the November 11, 1977 final rule was postponed pending review of the data. That review is now completed.

The Commissioner of Food and Drugs has considered the arguments and data submitted and concludes that they are insubstantial and present no genuine issue of material fact requiring a hearing. A full discussion follows.

I. The Drug

Biozyme Ointment contains neomycin palmitate equivalent to 3.5 milligrams of neomycin and trypsin-chymotrypsin concentrate (10,000 Armour units of proteolytic activity) in a water-soluble base of polyethylene glycol 400 and 4,000, and stearyl alcohol.

II. Recommended Uses

Biozyme Ointment is indicated for treating abscesses and furuncles (open or incised), infected burns, pyodermas, such as folliculitis and impetigo, infected skin ulcers, such as arterioscelrotic ulcers, decubitus ulcers, diabetic ulcers, stasis ulcers, traumatic ulcers, varicose ulcers, etc.